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ALWAYS CONNECTED ARMENIA AND THE 2026 ELECTIONS. REPORT



ARMENIA'S SECURITY
AND RESILIENCE
ELECTIONS 2026

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About the study

This study by the “Region” Research Center examines the peculiarities of media and social media coverage of the nationwide parliamentary elections held on June 7, 2026.

The study covered:

- Armenian-language election-related materials from 3 Armenian media outlets (Aravot.am, Civilnet.am, and Factor.am) and 2 foreign outlets operating in Armenia (Azatutyun.am and Sputnik Արմենիա).
- The official Facebook pages of all participating political forces.

What did we study in the course of our analysis of **4,656** election-related materials¹ produced jointly in the two pre-election phases on 5 media platforms, which have an influence on public opinion, and **4,770** materials on the Facebook pages of 18 political forces during the official campaign period?

- What means did the media outlets use to present the specifics of the electoral process and the messages of the participating political forces to their audiences?
- Who were the speakers, who did they speak about, how did they speak, and what topics did they address in the media during the campaign?
- In what way did the political forces use their Facebook pages: exclusively as channels for circulating campaign materials, or also as spaces for interactive communication with audiences?
- What reactions and audience reach did the Facebook and media content have during the elections?

¹ Throughout the 29 days of the official election campaign, approximately 85% of this total volume (3,990 election-related materials) was published on 5 media platforms.

How long did we conduct the study?

We worked in three stages:

- **The two weeks preceding the official campaign (23.04-7.05.2026)**, during which the names of the political forces that entered the race were determined, and their electoral lists were finalized. At this stage, we examined media platforms.
- **The official campaign stage (8.05-5.06.2026)**, during which, alongside the media platforms, we also examined the official Facebook pages of the participating political forces (19-1)².
- **The post-election stage (8.06-30.06, 2026)**, during which the first post-election statements were released, and the process of challenging the election results before the Constitutional Court was initiated. At this stage, we conducted a general overview of the political forces' Facebook pages and media platforms.

Study Methodology

What did we measure and how?

- Every Facebook status, campaign slogan posted on Facebook, and every media item (e.g., an interview, speech, or debate) shared on Facebook during the campaign period was counted as a single item. Excerpts from media items were also counted as separate items when they were reposted with newly added headlines or captions.
- Audience response to each Facebook post was measured by the total number of likes, shares, and comments.

² On the 19th day of the official campaign (May 26), Alliance Party withdrew from the electoral race.

- The intensity of coverage of each topic in the media was measured according to the "one item—one or more topics" principle.
- Representatives of political, public, professional, and other groups who addressed the topic under study were defined as the topic's authors (i.e., who is speaking). Their activity was measured according to the formulas "one author – one or more topics" and "the more authors, the more topics."
- The intensity of mentions of other political forces and their leaders, as well as other countries and international organizations (i.e., who is being talked about), was measured using the formula: "one author – one or more topics – one or more mentions of other political forces/figures/countries/organizations."
- The tone of references to others (i.e., how they are discussed: positive, negative, or neutral) was determined based on the direct semantic meaning of the wording, rather than on contextual interpretations or evaluations.
- The number of topics addressed in a single item was calculated based on changes in the authors of those topics and changes in the tone indicators of messages (+, -, 0). This was measured according to the formulas: "the more authors, the more topics" and "the more mentions of others, the more tone indicators (+, -, 0)."

What topics did we determine?

In the "**Electoral process**" thematic group, we categorized all references addressing election administration, the organization and implementation of electoral processes, coalition building, election annulment, and other related issues.

We examined and measured the topic of "**Electoral bribery/other violations**" separately.

We examined and measured the "**Campaign**" topic separately. In this group, we included references concerning the specific features of the campaign process, the pre-election atmosphere, rhetoric, and media coverage.

In the **“Foreign interference”** thematic group, we categorized both general references regarding the interference by other countries in Armenia’s elections, and media investigations into external information influences.

In the **“Karabakh conflict”** group, we included all references addressing the history and stages of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, as well as assessments of the strategies of the conflicting parties, their leaders, and external actors.

In the **“Security”** thematic group, we included statements related to the challenges facing the country in the context of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, as well as regional and international developments.

The **“Army”** thematic group was examined and measured separately. In this group, we included references addressing reforms in the army, armaments, military service, and other related issues.

The references included in the remaining 16 thematic groups correspond to the generally accepted understanding of these topics.

“Always Connected Armenia” and the 2026 Elections

Study Findings (23.04-08.07, 2026)

PART 1. The Election Campaign on Political Facebook Pages

The social media pages of the participating political forces served as another channel - and for some forces, the main channel - for covering their election campaigns.³ More broadly, they also became a primary information source for the media regarding in-person meetings and speeches of these forces in different communities.

With the exception of the Meritocratic Party of Armenia, which conducted its election campaign exclusively on Facebook, all other participating political forces also used 1 to 5 of their own additional social media pages (YouTube, Instagram, Tik-Tok, Telegram, and X) alongside Facebook. Some parties utilized their leaders' pre-existing accounts on other social networks for this purpose, which had a significantly higher number of followers and likes compared to the corresponding indicators of their official Facebook pages. For example, New Power Party also circulated pre-election videos on the Instagram and Tik-Tok accounts of its leader, Hayk Marutyan, while Kochari National Revival and Awakening of the Nation Party used the Tik-Tok account of its leader, Artak Sargsyan.

³ Among the participating political forces, Bright Armenia and National Democratic Alliance claimed during the campaign that they faced a “media blockade”/insufficient media attention, primarily referring to the Public Television and other publicly funded media. In making these statements, they highlighted the issue of disproportionate use and abuse of state resources.

In contrast to the media outlets included in the study, which published various but still limited numbers of election-related pieces as daily news in the months preceding the elections, a number of political forces had already begun their pre-election campaign on Facebook several months prior to the official launch date.⁴

It can be confidently stated that, overall, it was on social media that the pre-election campaigns of some participating forces began. Thus, [Strong Armenia Party](#) began promoting its structured pre-election communication activities on Facebook as early as December 2025.

Other political forces ([Civil Contract](#), [Hanrapetutyun](#), [Armenia Alliance](#), and [Prosperous Armenia](#)) started such activities (meetings with citizens in different communities, release of electoral program provisions, appeals and statements) from the beginning of 2026. This list also includes the participating forces that were established or created Facebook pages 2 to 4 months before the elections ([Against All](#), [Wings of Unity](#), and [New Power](#) parties).

How? Campaign Intensity on Official Political Facebook Pages

The political Facebook pages under study differed in terms of the volume of campaign-related materials, the presence or absence of daily updates, audience growth as a result of the electoral process, response dynamics, and other characteristics, with all measured indicators reaching their highest levels during the official campaign period.

The pre-election activity of the Facebook pages of political forces reached its peak during the official campaign period.

From the perspective of intensity (the proportion of materials published on the pages of political forces within the total volume of content generated across the official pages of all participating forces - 4,470 materials), three groups of political forces were formed:

⁴ The current RA Electoral Code does not prohibit political forces from conducting pre-election campaigning prior to the officially established timeframe.

- **Political forces with the most intensive campaign activity** - Armenia Alliance (19%), Civil Contract (14%), and National Democratic Alliance (11%).
- **Political forces with medium campaign intensity** - Wings of Unity (7%), Strong Armenia (5%), Armenian National Congress (5%), Bright Armenia (5%), and Democracy, Law, and Discipline (5%).
- **Political forces with the lowest campaign intensity** - Kochari National Revival and Awakening of the Nation (4%), Christian-Democratic Rebirth (4%)⁵, Prosperous Armenia (2%), Against All (2%), Hanrapetutyun Party (2%), Rally for the Republic Party (2%), Meritocratic Party of Armenia, Reformists Party, New Power, and Democratic Consolidation (1% each).

The parties that carried out their pre-election campaign more intensively than others on Facebook published up to 58 (Civil Contract), up to 50 (Armenia Alliance), up to 33 (National Democratic Alliance) materials in a single day, which is comparable to the daily output of a number of Armenian media outlets.

Among the political parties that produced the lowest number of materials for their audiences, 6 forces (Prosperous Armenia, Democratic Consolidation, Meritocratic Party of Armenia, New Power, Reformists Party and Kochari) also stood out in that they carried out the campaign on their Facebook pages on a non-daily basis.

See Appendix, Table 1.

⁵ The data presented here are not from the [official Facebook page](#) of Christian-Democratic Rebirth Party, but from the Facebook page of its leader, [Levon Shirinyan](#). No campaigning in the classical sense was conducted through the party's official page, which published only 5 materials on 2 out of the 29 campaign days (0.08%).

How? Visualization on Official Political Facebook Pages (8.05-7.06.2026)

On their official Facebook pages, 9 political forces conducted their campaigns predominantly through video content. Videos represented 93% of the content published by Strong Armenia, 85% by New Power, 84% by Armenia Alliance, 72% each by Wings of Unity and Prosperous Armenia, 70% by Democratic Consolidation, 68% by Civil Contract, 65% by Meritocratic Party of Armenia, and 61% by Bright Armenia.

During the official campaign stage, the Facebook pages of political forces provided their audiences not only with extensive⁶ campaign videos (livestreams/recordings of in-person meetings with residents of different communities), but also short thematic video clips accompanied by textual messages. The same approach was applied in the dissemination of the piece from the three televised debates organized by the Public Television during the final days of the campaign, each lasting more than 4 hours. Followers of the political forces' Facebook pages were presented with the TV debate series through short video excerpts featuring the statements of each force's representative, supplemented by accompanying messages. In some cases (for example, on the [official page of Bright Armenia Party](#)), these excerpted videos from the Public TV debates accounted for the largest share of all media pieces featuring the party during the entire campaign.

How? Sources of Materials on Official Political Facebook Pages

The bulk of campaign content published on the official pages of all participating forces was self-produced. Alongside traditional social media campaign content (short video messages, speeches structured around campaign slogans, information on parliamentary

⁶ For example, National Democratic Alliance held a telethon with a live connection between Armenia and the United States for the purpose of pre-election fundraising and circulated 5-hour videos about it on its Facebook page.

candidates, videos about meetings with citizens in different communities, etc.), the social media pages of the political forces also disseminated “media genre” pieces produced in-house and featuring leading political figures. These included interviews, podcasts,⁷ and videos addressing the most sensitive issues for the public⁸. These pieces, together with videos documenting various regional in-person meetings served as a primary source for a number of media outlets⁹.

Without exception, all political forces also shared on their Facebook pages interviews and debates hosted by various media outlets, in which their representatives had participated. This practice was also observed among the forces with substantial financial and media resources. For example, content originating from Armenian media outlets accounted for 15% of the materials published on the Civil Contract page at that stage, 5% on the Strong Armenia page, and 3% on the Armenia Alliance page. However, these three forces shared on their pages interviews from the Public TV, Armenia TV, Factor.am, Civic.am, and the “GlumOFF Podcast” (Radio “Van”).

On the pages of the remaining political forces, with the exception of Bright Armenia and National Democratic Alliance, the list of Armenian media outlets whose content was shared was more diverse.

See the figures below.

⁷ For example, the 7-part “Big Politics” podcast series on the Armenia Alliance Facebook page with the participation of alliance leader Robert Kocharyan, and the interview series titled “5 Questions for Future Prime Minister Samvel Karapetyan” on the Strong Armenia Facebook page.

⁸ For example, the pages of Strong Armenia and Armenia alliances posted AI-generated campaign videos, intended to illustrate possible outcomes should the current Armenian government's policy on Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement continue. The threat of “Azerbaijanization of Armenia” (formulated in this manner) was one of the campaign narratives of these two alliances, as well as a number of other opposition parties.

⁹ Throughout the campaign, the majority of scandalous videos containing inappropriate language or verbal altercations that circulated across various media outlets and featured representatives of various political forces and ordinary citizens were taken by the media we studied and other media outlets from the political forces’ social media accounts.

HOW. VISUALISATION OF CAMPAIGN MATERIALS IN FB POLITICAL PAGES

Mainly through videos

			
Strong Armenia	93%	Democratic Consolidation	70%
New Power	85%	Civil Contract	68%
Armenia Alliance	84%	Meritocratic Party	65%
Wing of Unity	72%	Bright Armenia	61%
Prosperous Armenia	72%		

SOURCES OF CAMPAIGN MATERIALS

ON FB POLITICAL PAGES. MATERIALS FROM MEDIA

Against All	25%
Kochari	23%
Democracy, Law, and Discipline	21%
Hanrapetutyun	19%
Bright Armenia	17%
Meritocratic Party	16%
Civil Contract	15%
National Democratic Alliance	12%
New Power	10%
Wing of Unity	10%
Prosperous Armenia	8%
Reformist' Party	8%
For the Republic	8%
Armenian National Congress	7%
Strong Armenia	5%
Armenia Alliance	3%


How? Audiences, Reactions, and Interactivity on Official Political Facebook Pages

The participating political forces differed substantially in the number of followers on their official Facebook pages. At the launch of the official campaign, Civil Contract Party (162,000) and Strong Armenia Alliance (137,000) had the largest Facebook audiences among all participating political forces. The number of followers of 8 political forces ranged from 15,000 (Armenian National Congress) to 95,000 (National Democratic Alliance). Kochari, Reformists, Against All, and New Power parties campaigned with more modest numbers of followers. Over the course of the 29 days of the campaign, a number of forces recorded an increase in the number of Facebook followers. However, this positive dynamics cannot necessarily be attributed to the intensity of campaigning in the case of all Facebook pages.

For instance, by the last day of the campaign, Strong Armenia Alliance, which carried out a relatively more intensive campaign on Facebook, recorded follower growth (around 15,000 followers) similar to that of Prosperous Armenia Party page, which campaigned with lower intensity. In another example, the National Democratic Alliance page, which was actively updated with campaign content on a daily basis throughout the 29-day period, recorded an increase of only 627 followers.

For more details, see Appendix, Table 2, and the figure below.

HOW. AUDIENCES AND RESPONSES TO CAMPAIGN MATERIALS **IN POLITICAL FACEBOOK PAGES**



Facebook political content conveying different messages received significantly different numbers of likes, comments, and shares.

In terms of audience reactions (measured as the aggregate number of likes, shares and comments), 5 competing political forces stood out: Civil Contract Party, Strong Armenia and Armenia alliances, Hanrapetutyun and National Democratic Alliance parties, in descending order.

Compared with the remaining political forces, materials published on the Facebook pages of these five competitors attracted markedly higher levels of audience reaction, with individual posts generating between several tens of thousands and around 100,000 combined likes, shares, and comments. Three materials on the Civil Contract page received more than 100,000 such reactions, making it the only political force to produce materials that reached this level of audience reaction. These reactions, however, not only reflected the users' approval or support, but also criticism, insults, and indecent labeling.

The campaign content published by the Against All Party's page, which was distinguished by frequent use of culturally specific idioms/allegories rooted in Armenian public discourse (e.g. "to beat water" - to engage in futile efforts, "to roll a barrel" - to unfairly attack or accuse someone, "to throw mud" - to discredit someone, etc.), as well as flashmobs, generated relatively modest levels of audience reaction. For the majority of the party's Facebook campaign materials, the number of reactions did not exceed 1,000.

For more details, see Appendix, Table 3.

Direct online interaction with audiences was not observed on the official Facebook pages of the political forces. Communication with citizens was reflected through video pieces documenting the meetings with residents in different communities.

Instead, both through standalone Facebook publications and during in-person campaign speeches, quite intense verbal confrontations took place, involving scandalous statements, insults, defamatory remarks, hate speech, and labeling (often in response to criticism/insults expressed by rival forces in other parts of Armenia on the same day).

A series of scandalous incidents that rapidly spread across Facebook and in the media were recorded during the campaign visits of Nikol Pashinyan, the leader of Civil Contract Party.¹⁰ Videos covering these confrontations were widely circulated by various media outlets. Later, livestream videos of several such incidents were no longer available on Pashinyan's Facebook page.

However, these were not isolated cases of escalated rhetoric between competing forces (representatives of the incumbent government and various opposition forces) recorded on Facebook pages of the political forces during the campaign.

A number of opposition forces were also subject to labeling and harsh language, for example, on the page of Levon Shirinyan, the leader of Christian-Democratic Rebirth Party, where such references appeared in posts authored solely by him. The vocabulary used in many cases was consistent with the public rhetoric of the Civil Contract officials.¹¹

For the majority of political forces, campaign content on their official Facebook pages was built mainly around the campaign speeches of their political leader/one or two other leading figures.

Most of the pieces published on the Civil Contract Facebook page featured speeches by its leader Nikol Pashinyan. A smaller share of the page's content featured individual Facebook appearances by other party members, or their speeches delivered during the same meetings.

During the campaign, the Civil Contract Facebook page disseminated announcements about telephone conversations between [Nikol Pashinyan and Recep Tayyip Erdogan](#), and between [Nikol Pashinyan and Vladimir Putin](#), alongside the interstate document signed in Yerevan by [RA Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio](#). The information was taken from the official websites of the RA Government and the RA Foreign Ministry and concerned the state activities of these officials.

¹⁰ For example, Nikol Pashinyan's debate with Artsakh Armenian activist Artur Osipyan, involving personal insults against him, accusations addressed personally to Pashinyan by various citizens in Yerevan and several communities, and other episodes.

¹¹ On Levon Shirinyan's page, opposition forces were targeted with labels such as "Russia-addicted," "spy agents," "Kremlin Trojan horses," "revanchists," "Putinoids," etc. A whole range of similar offensive formulations was directed at the so-called "Karabakh clan," and Armenians of Artsakh.

PART 2. The Election Campaign in the Media

Unlike Armenian audiovisual media, media outlets operating exclusively or also online are not subject to the obligation to provide balanced coverage of the election campaigns of the participating political forces.

Under the RA Electoral Code, online media outlets are required to ensure equal treatment of the participating forces in terms of fees charged for political advertising.¹²

Of the 3 Armenian media outlets studied by us (Aravot.am, Civilnet.am, and Factor.am), political advertising was observed only on Aravot.am and Civilnet.am. These two outlets provided space for campaign advertisements from 4 political forces: Civil Contract, Strong Armenia, Armenia Alliance, and Wings of Unity. Factor.am did not publish any political advertisements.

How? Intensity and Polyphony in the Media

During the campaign period, the topic of elections reached its highest level of intensity in the media, similar to the peak observed on the Facebook pages of political forces. For each of the 5 media outlets studied, the maximum number of election-related materials recorded on a single official campaign day was as follows: Azatutyun.am - 15 materials, Civilnet.am - 18, Factor.am - 38, Sputnik Armenia - 55, and Aravot.am - 86.¹³

¹² RA Electoral Code, Articles 19, 20, 20.1, <https://www.irtek.am/views/act.aspx?aid=150051>

¹³ For comparison, in the two weeks preceding the official campaign, the maximum number of election-related materials published on a single day was, for example, 40 on Aravot.am and 19 on Sputnik Armenia.

The difference in the number of election-related materials among the studied media was conditioned not by a higher or lower level of interest in Armenia's national electoral process, but rather by their editorial style, thematic and professional preferences, and consequently, by different approaches to presenting the pre-election process. The coverage of the election process on the studied media platforms was complemented by journalists' authored pieces, as well as comments/statements from bodies responsible for election administration, public-political groups, and representatives of foreign countries/international organizations.

The study recorded varying shares of "election-related statements" in each media outlet.

- Azatutyun.am included statements by representatives of 11 competing political forces and 9 other groups during the official campaign.
- Sputnik Armenia online platform featured statements by representatives of 13 competing forces and 13 other groups.
- Aravot.am provided its audience with statements by all 18 participating political forces (including Alliance Party until its withdrawal announcement on May 26) and 17 different groups.
- Factor.am's audience during that period could access statements by all 18 participating political forces and the views expressed by representatives of 12 other groups.
- Civilnet.am's audience could access the views of representatives of 16 participating political forces and 8 other groups.

See Appendix, Table 4.

The media's work in this direction was primarily focused on covering the campaigns of the political forces taking part in the elections. Videos of their meetings in different communities (including those obtained from the Facebook pages of these political forces) often served as the original source of information. At the same time, a number of interviews/debates were held within the framework of the media outlets' program cycles of this format.¹⁴

¹⁴ Azatutyun.am - "Debate" program cycle; Factor.am - "Interview," "Debate/Pre-Election Debate"; Civilnet.am - "Interview," "Debate"; Aravot.am - "Confrontation," "Watershed," and "Alternative Agenda" program cycles.

Without exception, all media outlets published as part of their pre-election day news coverage statements from the RA law enforcement/other official bodies, viewpoints of representatives of foreign countries/international organizations regarding Armenia's electoral context, as well as opinions of ordinary citizens about various political forces.

The voice of citizens and their attitude towards political forces were reflected on these online platforms mainly within the coverage of campaigns held in different communities.

In this regard, citizens' "participation" in the pre-election process reached unprecedented levels.

On Azatutyun.am, the volume of citizens' statements regarding the elections and the participating forces was approximately equal (7% of all published opinions) to the volume of statements by experts/NGO representatives/other specialists, or the number of statements by Prosperous Armenia and Armenia Alliance participating in the race. A roughly similar picture was observed on Factor.am as well. The difference between the share of citizens' statements in Aravot.am materials (9% of all published opinions) and the statements by Prosperous Armenia and Civil Contract parties amounted to only 1%. The lowest level of citizens' statements was registered on Sputnik Armenia, amounting to 0.6%.

The involvement of representatives of various countries/international organizations as "speakers" in the election campaign took place within the framework of daily news/event-based reporting.¹⁵

In all media outlets, the group of foreign "speakers" was dominated by the opinions and comments of Russian representatives (Azatutyun.am - 69%, Sputnik Armenia - 89%, Aravot.am - 65%, Factor.am - 50%, and Civilnet.am - 56%). Their statements

¹⁵ For example, the 8th European Political Community Summit and Armenia-EU Summit held in Yerevan three days before the beginning of the official campaign, together with the statements by the leaders of European states expressing support for Armenia's current government in the forthcoming elections, resulted in higher indicators of the institutional statements of European states and the EU during that pre-election stage. See: "Selected data from the first, pre-official campaign phase" (Who spoke? Whose public statements on elections were most frequently presented to audiences?), <https://www.regioncenter.info/en/media-metrics/2239>.

concerned the possible outcomes of Armenia's electoral processes and the potential consequences for the country, the interference of the EU, rather than Russia, in the electoral processes of Armenia, as well as the ban imposed by the "Rosselkhoznadzor" on the import of a number of Armenian products during the pre-election period. Meanwhile, during the campaign, the statements of representatives of other countries with no less interest in the outcome of the Armenian elections (Turkey and Azerbaijan), registered considerably lower indicators.

See Appendix, Table 4.

The polyphony recorded in the media was driven by the interest observed both in the period preceding the campaign and during the campaign itself, owing to the fact that throughout the electoral process (and even before it) the significance of the 2026 elections was frequently discussed, with them being described as pivotal/historic/existential for Armenia's sovereignty/statehood.

As a result of the editorial styles and production capabilities of the mentioned media outlets under review, as well as other circumstances (such as the large number of participating forces), the outlets focused on covering the campaigns of political forces in different communities, often using as their original source the videos circulated by those forces on Facebook. A substantial portion of the pre-election "news of the day" presented by the media concerned scandalous developments (including instances of the use of harsh rhetoric between a number of forces, incidents/confrontations that occurred during campaign meetings, announcements, statements, and audio recordings by official institutions concerning electoral violations). The media outlets also held interviews/debates with the participation of various political forces within the framework of their program cycles of this format.¹⁶

How? Visualization of Campaign Materials and Their Views

The volume of visualization of the official campaign in the media was nearly identical to the level recorded during the two weeks preceding that stage. This was also conditioned by the editorial styles and other peculiarities of the studied media outlets (for

¹⁶ Azatutyun.am - "Debate" program cycle; Factor.am - "Interview," "Debate/Pre-Election Debate"; Civilnet.am - "Interview," "Debate"; Aravot.am - "Confrontation," "Watershed," and "Alternative Agenda" program cycles.

instance, text materials prevailed on Sputnik Արմենիա and Civilnet.am, video materials were dominant on Factor.am, while Azatutyun.am and Aravot.am maintained a roughly balanced ratio between text and video materials).


Election-related videos undoubtedly generated higher audience interest compared to the level recorded during the stage preceding the official campaign.¹⁷

There were videos on Azatutyun.am, Aravot.am, Factor.am, and Civilnet.am that received between a few dozen to 100,000 views (Sputnik Armenia does not publicly disclose its video view statistics). Throughout all these views and during the campaign, the high-profile incidents and the remote disputes between the political forces around the question of “who was and is who in Armenian political life” reached a wider audience.

See the figures below.

¹⁷ In the period preceding the official campaign, when verbal confrontation in public platforms had not yet reached its peak, only two of the examined media outlets (Factor.am and Aravot.am) had election-related videos that reached up to 100,000 views. During the official campaign period, videos with a similar level of audience reach were also observed among the other media outlets.

**Visualization in the Media Prior to the Official Campaign
(23.04-7.05, 2026)**




**Visualization in the Media During the Official Campaign Period
(8.05-5.06, 2026)**

**HOW. VISUALISATION OF CAMPAIGN MATERIALS
IN MEDIA OUTLETS**

					
Azatutyun.am	55%	45%	Civilnet.am	27%	73%
Sputnik Armenia	15%	85%	Factor.am	64%	36%
			Aravot.am	42%	58%

View Figures During the Official Campaign Period (8.05-5.06.2026)

How? Audiences and Responses to Campaign Materials



*Sputnik Armenia does not publicly disclose the viewership statistics of its videos.

How. Sources of Campaign Materials in the Media

With the exception of Aravot.am (55%), self-produced materials constituted the overwhelming majority in all of the studied media outlets, accounting for 95% on Azatutyun.am, 75% on Factor.am, 71% on Sputnik Armenia, and 70% on Civilnet.am. Nearly half of the Aravot.am materials devoted to the campaign and the electoral process came from other sources.

The media outlets also differed in their approaches to the use of other sources of information.

The highest share of references to or full reprints of materials from other Armenian media outlets was recorded on Aravot.am (10% of all published materials). Aravot.am also had the highest share of posts by various social media users, which constituted 17% of all published materials, while on Sputnik Armenia such posts made up 10% of all published materials.

Azatutyun.am recorded the lowest share of materials containing references to conventional “other sources,”¹⁸ with such content accounting for just 3%. It also disseminated the smallest share of campaign-related social media content, which made up 1% of its published materials.


It is noteworthy that none of the studied media platforms used materials from pro-Civil Contract outlets (Armtimes.com, Civic.am, and MediaNews¹⁹).

See the figure below.

¹⁸ The “Other sources” category included communications issued by Armenian law enforcement/other official bodies, publications of foreign media, and materials from various foreign institutions.

¹⁹ This latter platform drew the attention of Civilnet.am's fact-checking team during the campaign due to a series of manipulative publications, “MediaNews' “public opinion,” fake profiles and a possible link to Taron Chakhoyan” <https://civilnet.am/hy/news/1011416>.

SOURCES OF CAMPAIGN MATERIALS IN MEDIA OUTLETS



Counter-Campaign in the Media: Who Spoke About Whom and How? **(23.04-7.05, 8.05-5.06)**

The campaign in the media, carried out by various actors - political forces, journalists, experts/NGO representatives/other specialists, ordinary citizens, and others - was largely based on counter-campaign and negative mentions of “other forces,” those responsible for the atmosphere of the electoral process, and external actors.

This counter-campaign was carried out through clear targeting, use of hate speech, personal insults, threats of legal consequences, labeling, and defamation. This is demonstrated by the data on the correlation of connotation signs in all the studied media outlets: negative mentions substantially outnumbered those marked as neutral or positive.

See Appendix, Table 6.

Civil Contract ranked first in terms of negative, clearly targeted evaluations on Azatutyun.am (20% of 612 (-) mentions of others) and Factor.am (22% of 779 (-) mentions).

In the remaining media outlets, negative mentions made by the ruling force appeared at lower positions. Notably, the overwhelming majority of all negative mentions/portrayals of others made by Civil Contract in the media were delivered by Nikol Pashinyan himself.

On Sputnik Armenia, in this regard, critical statements were more frequently made by experts, representatives of Armenia Alliance, and, among foreign actors, by representatives of Russia.

On Aravot.am, Strong Armenia and Armenia alliances accounted for the largest shares of statements directed against Civil Contract, with 15% and 12%, respectively. Meanwhile, negative mentions by Civil Contract concerning other actors, including Prosperous Armenia, constituted 7%. On the same platform, an identical share (7%) was recorded for statements made by Prosperous Armenia concerning Civil Contract and the policies pursued by it.

Statements by political rivals containing various labels were also referenced/countered by those targeted on the same campaign day and in the days that followed, thereby increasing the number of scandalous materials on media platforms. Factor.am, for example, in such cases added a note to the materials that read: "The video contains offensive language. Factor TV, prioritizing the public's right to be informed during the pre-election period, publishes political figures' statements verbatim, while at the same time condemning this type of rhetoric and calling for restraint from insults and hate speech."²⁰

Although the main exchanges took place between Civil Contract on one side and Strong Armenia and Armenia alliances, as well as Prosperous Armenia and Wings of Unity parties on the other, negative mentions by other forces also appeared in the media, albeit to a lesser extent.

The statements made by the political forces demonstrated that for some of them, including the forces mentioned above, the main positive outcome expected from the pre-election efforts was the removal of Civil Contract and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from power (a change of power). For other forces, however, the desired outcome was the so-called "opposition change." For the forces that entered the electoral race with this objective, the concept of "opposition change" referred to the exclusion of the existing opposition forces (former government forces) from the National Assembly and pushing them to the political margins. Despite these differing objectives, a substantial part of the negative portrayals of all participating forces in the media - especially during the official campaign - concerned the ruling force and its leader, Nikol Pashinyan, personally.

On **Azatutyun.am**, on the one hand, the data show that 67% of all negative mentions concerned Civil Contract, while on the other hand, negative statements targeting each of other 5 political forces (Bright Armenia, Wings of Unity, New Power, Alliance Party, and Hanrapetutyun) did not exceed 1%.

²⁰ ["Get lost, you dimwit': heated exchange between Pashinyan and Artur Osipyan" \(Factor.am\)](#); ["Kocharyan called Pashinyan a 'dimwit,' and the Prime Minister responded with the same word", "Strong Armenia' stokes the issue of '300,000 Azerbaijanis'; Pashinyan hits back: 'The person saying that is only making a fool of himself.'"](#) (Azatutyun.am); ["So that there are no longer madmen in power': Robert Kocharyan"](#) (Aravot.am); ["I'll bring you to your knees': Pashinyan started shouting after the remarks of the sister of a missing lieutenant colonel"](#) (Sputnik Armenia).

On **Sputnik Armenia**, 82% of all negative mentions were directed at Civil Contract, while corresponding shares for other political forces were as follows: Strong Armenia - 11%, Prosperous Armenia - 6%, Armenia Alliance - 1%, and Wings of Unity - 0.2%. It was also recorded that no negative assessments were made regarding the remaining 14 political forces.

On **Aravot.am**, **Civilnet.am**, and **Factor.am**, the political forces accounting for the highest shares of negative mentions with specific portrayals were the same (in descending order: Civil Contract, Strong Armenia, Prosperous Armenia, and Armenia Alliance). The share of negative assessments concerning the remaining political forces did not exceed 0.3% of all negative mentions on Aravot.am, 0.5% on Civilnet.am, and 1% on Factor.am.

See the figures below, as well as Appendix, Tables 5, 6 and 7.

MEDIA. WHO AND HOW DURING THE CAMPAIGN

Azatutyun.am

From 612 (-) mentions

Civil Contract	20%
NGO/expert/other specialist	10%
Journalist	10%
Strong Armenia	11%
Armenia Alliance	11%
Prosperous Armenia	11%
Force Structures	7%
Citizen	6%
Wings of Unity	3%
LBright Armenia	2%

The remaining 19% of negative evaluations were made by representatives of other political forces and public groups.

Sputnik Armenia

From 655 (-) mentions

NGO/expert/other specialist	15%
Armenia Alliance	12%
Foreign country representative	11%
Strong Armenia	11%
Force Structures	10%
Civil Contract	8%
Prosperous Armenia	7%
Bright Armenia	5%
Wings of Unity	4%

The remaining 17% of negative evaluations were made by representatives of other political forces and public groups.

MEDIA. WHO AND HOW DURING THE CAMPAIGN

Civilnet.am

From 291 (-) mentions

Journalist	19%
NGO/expert/other specialist	12%
Civil Contract.....	9%
Force Structures.....	7%
Strong Armenia	6%
Armenia Alliance.....	5%
Wings of Unity.....	5%
National Congress.....	4%
Hanrapetutyun	4%
Representative of Artsakh.....	3%
Prosperous Armenia	3%
IBright Armenia.....	3%
Citizen.....	3%

The remaining 19% of negative evaluations were made by representatives of other political forces and public groups.

Factor.am

From 779 (-) mentions

Civil Contract	22%
Armenia Alliance.....	11%
Force Structures.....	9%
Strong Armenia.....	8%
Prosperous Armenia.....	7%
Citizen	6%
Against All.....	5%
Bright Armenia.....	4%
Journalist.....	4%
NGO/expert/other specialist.....	4%
Wings of Unity.....	3%
Hanrapetutyun.....	3%

The remaining 14% of negative evaluations were made by representatives of other political forces and public groups.

Aravot.am

From 2172 (-) mentions

Strong Armenia	15%
Armenia Alliance	12%
Journalist	10%
NGO/expert/other specialist ...	10%
Prosperous Armenia	7%
Civil Contract	7%
Citizen	6%
Wings of Unity	4%
Republic Party	4%
Bright Armenia	3%
Public-political figure	3%

The remaining 17% of negative evaluations were made by representatives of other political forces and public groups.

WHICH PARTICIPATING POLITICAL FORCES WAS THE CAMPAIGN DIRECTED AGAINST? WHO RECEIVED NEGATIVE ASSESSMENTS (-)?

Azatutyun.am

Civil Contract.....	67.3%
Strong Armenia.....	18.8%
Prosperous Armenia.....	8.7%
Armenia Alliance.....	3%

Negative assessments directed at the other five political forces (Bright Armenia, Wings of Unity, New Power, Alliance, Hanrapetutyun) accounted for less than 1% each.

Other 10 participating political forces were not mentioned with a negative sign.

Sputnik Արմենիա

Civil Contract.....	82%
Strong Armenia.....	11%
Prosperous Armenia.....	6%
Armenia Alliance.....	1.4%
Wings of Unity.....	0.2%

Other 14 participating political forces were not mentioned with a negative sign.

WHICH PARTICIPATING POLITICAL FORCES WAS THE CAMPAIGN DIRECTED AGAINST? WHO RECEIVED NEGATIVE ASSESSMENTS (-)?

Civilnet.am

Civil Contract..... 66.5%
Strong Armenia..... 20%
Prosperous Armenia..... 8%
Armenia Alliance..... 2%
New Power..... 1%

Negative assessments directed at the other 5 political forces (Wings of Unity, Bright Armenia, Against All, Democracy, Law, and Discipline, Meritocratic Party) did not exceed 0.5%

Factor.am

Civil Contract 57%
Strong Armenia 28%
Prosperous Armenia 9%
Armenia Alliance 2%

The number of negative mentions to each of the other 15 political forces did not exceed 1%.

Aravot.am

Civil Contract..... 88%
Strong Armenia..... 7%
Prosperous Armenia..... 3%
Armenia Alliance..... 1%

Negative assessments directed at the other 7 political forces (Wings of Unity, Bright Armenia, Against All, Democracy, Law, and Discipline, Hanrapetutyun) did not exceed 0.3%

What Were the Elections About? Topics Advanced in the Media (23.04-7.05, 8.05-5.06)

During the official campaign, as in the preceding two weeks, among all 23 topics covered in the media, those related to the pre-election race dominated:

- **the electoral process** - in the context of election administration, domestic and international observation missions, possible outcomes, and other developments;
- **violations** - in the context of vote buying, inequality/abuse of resources, and obstruction of the campaign during the race;
- **the campaign** - mainly in the context of a tough competitive atmosphere and rhetoric.

The topic of the legal system ranked among the most intensively discussed topics due to official announcements concerning arrests, initiated criminal proceedings, which generated successive waves of opinions/assessments, as well as counter-statements from the forces mentioned in the context of electoral bribery. The prominence of the topic was therefore not shaped by particularly intensive information flows related to electoral program provisions in this sphere during the campaign. For comparison, it is worth noting that during the previous two national elections, the topic of the legal system was not circulated to the same extent through “news of the day” coverage and did not appear among the topics describing the course of the elections.²¹

Media outlets produced a limited number of thematic materials in which the programmatic provisions of various key political actors on publicly important and sensitive issues were presented (Azatutyun.am, Civilnet.am). For this purpose, interviews and debate programs with the participation of various political forces and experts were also broadcast (Factor.am, Aravot.am, Civilnet.am, and Azatutyun.am).

²¹ See [“2018 Snap Elections and Post-Election Political Agendas on Online Platforms in Armenia,”](#) p. 19-20, [“The Context of Conflict and Development Prospects in Armenia’s 2021 Elections,”](#) p. 72.

Due to different emphases, topics such as the **Karabakh conflict**²² (a central topic of the 2021 elections), the **problems of Artsakh Armenians** following forced displacement, **Armenian captives held in Azerbaijan**, and the **Church-related developments** (one of the key topics in Armenian media and social media platforms during the entire year preceding the elections) appeared among the lowest-ranked topics in the media's thematic list.

The number of materials devoted to **foreign interference** was unexpectedly low, despite the topic having been widely discussed at the state, public, and international levels ahead of the elections in Armenia. The figures for this topic resulted from statements by competing political forces²³ regarding foreign information flows, and journalists' exposure (Civilnet.am, Factor.am²⁴) of specific examples of such flows.

The discourse on foreign interference reflected in the media was also shaped by developments occurring at the official Armenian-Russian and Armenian-American levels during the pre-election period. Restrictions imposed by Russia on the import of a number of Armenian products during the election period and the influx of Armenian citizens residing in Russia before election day were interpreted as attempts by Russia to use economic leverage to influence the election outcome, while US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's visit to Armenia, accompanied by the signing of interstate documents, was viewed as another demonstration of US support

²² It should be noted that this group included statements referring to the history of the conflict (wars, casualties and other losses, negotiations, mediators, the parties involved and their leaders, and other issues) up until the initialing of Armenian-Azerbaijani peace documents in the United States in August 2025.

²³ For example, the statement by Arman Tatoyan, the leader of Wings of Unity Party, regarding new Azerbaijani interference in the NA elections: "The European Union has announced that it is fighting against Russian interference in our elections, which is very good, but the same approach should be applied equally, with efforts directed to counter all instances of interference, including the Azerbaijani one," Aravot.am, <https://www.aravot.am/2026/05/19/1557745/>.

²⁴ For example, "'Leaked documents' without evidence: who is behind *Хроника Кавказа* (*Khronika Kavkaza*), and how did it spread in Armenia?", <https://factor.am/1022922.html>; "Russia's 'Matryoshka' is spreading deepfakes that contain calls to kill Pashinyan," <https://civilnet.am/en/news/1012122>.

for Civil Contract and its leader. A further example of this support was US President Donald Trump's statement²⁵ of “complete and total” endorsement of Nikol Pashinyan during the pre-election campaign.

See the figure below, as well as Appendix, Tables 8 and 9.

²⁵ “Trump expresses his complete endorsement of Pashinyan,” <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/trampn-ir-liakatar-ajaktsoutyounn-e-haytnoum-pashinyanin/33767269.html>

WHAT WAS THE CAMPAIGN ABOUT?

TOPICS COVERED IN THE MEDIA

Azatutyun.am

Election bribery/other violations.....	20%
Campaign	15%
Foreign policy	13%
Legal system	12%
Security	10%
Socio-economical issues	7%

Sputnik Արմենիա

Foreign policy.....	19%
Campaign.....	15%
Socio-economical issues.....	11%
Legal system.....	10%
Election bribery/other violations.....	9%
Security	9%

Civilnet.am

Security	20%
Foreign interference	10%
Campaign	9%
Legal system	9%
Karabakh conflict	8%
Election bribery/other violations ...	8%

Factor.am

Domestic	23%
Campaign	12%
Security	10%
Election bribery/other violations.....	10%
Security System	9%
Foreign policy	9%
Socio-economical issues	8%

Aravot.am

Domestic	13%
Campaign	12%
Security	12%
Foreign Policy	10%
Socio-economical issues	9%
Election bribery/other violations	8%
Security system	7%

Narratives on issues of public significance (including the claim that the Karabakh conflict should be considered closed, the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, security challenges, and the war and peace narrative) unfolded in the context of reciprocal counterarguments between Civil Contract and opposition forces.²⁶ This was reflected, for example, in the claims whereby opposition forces characterized Civil Contract and personally Nikol Pashinyan as a source of the threat of war, while the main rivals of Civil Contract, in turn, were portrayed as proponents of war. Using the formulation “three-headed party of war,” Nikol Pashinyan and members of his party referred to Strong Armenia and Armenia alliances, Prosperous Armenia Party, and, at times, also the Republican Party of Armenia (which did not participate in the elections), along with Wings of Unity, which they described as “its tail.”

In other instances, opposition representatives portrayed Nikol Pashinyan as acting at the behest of Azerbaijan and Turkey, whereas Pashinyan, in turn, called the opposition forces [“witnesses of Aliyev and Lukashenko.”](#)

Another point of contention was whether the narrative concerning “Western Azerbaijan and the return of Azerbaijanis” had any substantive basis. According to Civil Contract representatives, it did not, while representatives of a number of opposition forces presented it as a real threat to Armenia.²⁷

²⁶ In a Facebook post accompanying one of his campaign speeches, Pashinyan [wrote](#): “Voting for the three-headed party of war means leading Armenia back into the vortex of war.” Robert Kocharyan [countered](#): “How many wars have I brought to the Republic of Armenia? Can you say? Now you tell me: how many wars has Nikol Pashinyan brought to the Republic of Armenia?”

²⁷ “I suspect that Pashinyan is realizing Aliyev’s dream today. He is making way for Azerbaijanis... And over the next five years, he will implement Aliyev’s concept of Western Azerbaijan,” Samvel Karapetyan, the leader of Strong Armenia Party [stated](#). “What’s all this about? What is this claim about 300,000 Azerbaijanis? I officially tell you that we closed this issue once and for all in 2024 and 2023; in 2024 in particular, we definitively put an end to this issue... Why is the three-headed party of war spending millions to reopen it? Peace has been established between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” [stated](#) Nikol Pashinyan.

If throughout the entire pre-election period the narrative that “the alternative to Civil Contract is war” referred exclusively to rival political forces, in the post-election period it was also extended to the citizens who had voted for the opposition.

In one of his first post-election speeches, Nikol Pashinyan stated that Azerbaijan could have mistakenly perceived that there are 500 thousand citizens in Armenia who believe that a “sea-to-sea Armenia” should be restored, Karabakh should be brought back, and the peace agreement should be revised. “If we fail to manage this situation now, and a perception takes hold that there are 500 thousand people in the Republic of Armenia who say that we should continue the Karabakh movement, this will seriously aggravate the military-political situation in Armenia.” Immediately after the elections, a meeting between the RA Security Council Secretary and Azerbaijani President’s Assistant was held to address this threat.²⁸

PART 3. Post-Election Agendas on Political Facebook Pages and in the Media

The main intrigue of the first post-election week was the decision of the Central Electoral Commission to annul the results from three polling stations without scheduling a re-vote there.

Apart from Civil Contract, which circulated the highest number of statements on post-election activities and developments during that first week and published the largest number of materials²⁹ on its official Facebook page, the remaining official political pages -

²⁸ “The Grigoryan–Hajiyev meeting was aimed at managing the threat of war,” <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33783088.html>

²⁹ At his first post-election press conference, Civil Contract leader Nikol Pashinyan declared: “Our upcoming political agenda can be nothing other than stripping the three-headed party of war of its assets. In this regard, the revolution can no longer remain velvet”; “...The parties that resorted to vote buying, the parties filled with spies and foreign agents, have no mandate whatsoever. Do you hear me? They must not enter the National Assembly. These parties must be dissolved, and their owners will go to prison”; and “Those who tried to seize the people’s power will end up behind bars. The countdown has begun,” <https://www.facebook.com/civilcontractarmenia>

including those that had campaigned with high and medium intensity - appeared to be in a “wait-and-see” mode. Nevertheless, most of this relatively smaller number of materials were also devoted to the activities of the post-election stage: such materials made up 60% of posts on the Armenia Alliance page, 85% on the Strong Armenia Alliance page, 80% on the Wings of Unity page, and 70% on the National Democratic Alliance page.

During the first post-election week, up to 1/3 of all election-related materials in the monitored media outlets focused on opinions and speculations concerning possible post-election developments, including whether opposition forces would accept their mandates, challenge the election results, and other scenarios contingent on the Constitutional Court’s decision. Materials discussing possible post-election developments accounted for approximately 31% of the weekly election-related content on Azatutyun.am and Factor.am, 22% on Civilnet.am, and about 17% on Sputnik Armenia and Aravot.am.

The activity on political Facebook pages resumed after the Central Electoral Commission published the aforementioned decision regarding the results from three polling stations.³⁰

A protest demanding the annulment of the election results was held outside the Central Electoral Commission building. The event was livestreamed on the [Facebook page](#) of Strong Armenia Alliance and covered by the media.³¹ In a joint statement, 6 political forces (Strong Armenia and Armenia alliances, Prosperous Armenia, Bright Armenia, Armenian National Congress, and National Democratic Alliance parties) emphasized that:

- the elections were accompanied by administrative resource abuse, political persecution, and arrests, which served, especially during the campaign, to instill an atmosphere of fear among the public;

³⁰ The CEC decision also resulted in vote losses for the three political forces that had won seats in the National Assembly - Civil Contract Party, Strong Armenia Alliance, and Armenia Alliance. However, the decision had the greatest impact on Prosperous Armenia Party, whose vote total was no longer sufficient to pass the electoral threshold.

³¹ <https://www.aravot.am/2026/06/14/1563539/>, <https://factor.am/1030616.html>, <https://civilnet.am/hy/news/1012515>, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33774415.html>

- the activities of opposition campaign offices were deliberately obstructed on the eve of the vote and on election day;
- information campaign tools were abused, with even state media resources being used to discredit the opposition and disseminate hate speech;
- the results from polling stations were selectively invalidated;
- the announcement of victory by the leader of the ruling force before the publication of the official figures constituted direct interference in the election results.

The joint statement was published the same day on the official Facebook pages of all the political forces that had adopted it, thereby making it the first coordinated action by a group of opposition parties during the entire electoral process.³²

Despite the signatories' shared view regarding the illegitimacy of the entire electoral process, only 3 of them (Strong Armenia and Armenia alliances and Prosperous Armenia Party) applied to the Constitutional Court seeking the invalidation of the election results. The applications also relied on the issues outlined in the joint statement.

Wings of Unity, Democracy, Law and Discipline³³, New Power and Rally for the Republic parties also filed applications with the Constitutional Court and issued separate statements on Facebook.

The application submitted by this latter party was directed against the forces about which law enforcement agencies had disseminated numerous communications during the electoral process alleging vote-buying. Rally for the Republic Party had serious concerns regarding the legitimacy of the votes obtained by the political minority in the future National Assembly, unlike the political

³² <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1986x2PVvk/>, <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1bA7cbeug6/>, <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/198zA55FUP/>, <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/14jHJuG4VmA/>, <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1HxxgTZdYn/>, <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18kYCD4a8/>

³³ The application submitted by Democracy, Law and Discipline Party to the Constitutional Court concerned the invalidation of the Central Electoral Commission's decision, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/d%D6%85k-kousaktsoutyouny-evs-dimets-sd/33784537.html>

majority, which was “formed through the free expression of the people’s will.”³⁴ During that period, this party stated several times on its [official Facebook page](#) that its application should not be equated with those submitted by other forces as it aimed for the Constitutional Court to recognize instances of vote buying as “a violation of the constitutional principle of free elections.”³⁵

The Wings of Unity Party's application focused on the use of administrative resources by the authorities and the pressure exerted not only on political forces but also on voters. According to the party, this pressure negatively affected the attendance in its campaign rallies. Wings of Unity also complained that Civil Contract, which secured the political majority, had surpassed the legally permitted campaign expenditure limit and had covered up the violation.³⁶

Hanrapetutyun Party, which did not participate in the appeal proceedings, continued to publish post-election interviews with media outlets on its Facebook page, presenting its assessments of the electoral process. In these interviews, the party targeted the new political minority in the National Assembly, arguing that “people voted for Civil Contract because Armenians from abroad were coming to vote for Tashir Samo.”³⁷ In one of the post-election interviews, party leader Aram Sargsyan also explained why the “pro-Western” forces had failed to run in the elections as a united bloc, saying that his proposal to Pashinyan for a joint electoral format had been rejected.³⁸

³⁴ “Russian forces are Armenia’s number one threat”: Rally for the Republic party also applied to the Constitutional Court, <https://factor.am/1032887.html>

³⁵ During the hearings at the Constitutional Court, the representative of the Rally for the Republic Party referred to data from the RA Prosecutor's Office, according to which, as of June 24, there had been 423 reports on alleged crimes related to the electoral process, 332 criminal proceedings had been initiated, criminal prosecution had been launched against 391 individuals, 370 individuals had been arrested, with only 8 subsequently released as the suspicions against them were not confirmed (Factor.am, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mv_ZJDxFn5o)

³⁶ “Wings of Unity” files constitutional court appeal, alleging a violation of the principle of electoral equality, <https://arm.sputniknews.ru/20260619/miasnutjan-tevery-dimec-sd-chi-pahpanvel-yntrutjunneri-havasarutjan-skzbunqy-103650538.html>

³⁷ <https://www.armtimes.com/hy/article/338936>

³⁸ “I proposed to the Prime Minister that Civil Contract and pro-Western forces run on a joint electoral list, but he turned it down,” <https://factor.am/1036070.html>

Democratic Consolidation Party also took part in post-election discussions (addressing issues such as what happened and why the opposition remained unchanged) through interviews published on its page.³⁹

Meanwhile, Prosperous Armenia streamed the Constitutional Court daily hearings on its [Facebook page](#).

On July 4, the Constitutional Court ruled to reject all submitted applications and leave the CEC decision in force.

In another joint statement published on Facebook, 6 political forces (Strong Armenia and Armenia alliances, Prosperous Armenia, Bright Armenia, Armenian National Congress, and National Democratic Alliance parties) emphasized that the decision neither resolved the issue of the authorities' legitimacy nor addressed Armenia's deep political crisis. They also announced their next steps: preventing the forced constitutional change, defending the Armenian Apostolic Church, and fighting for the rights of political prisoners.

Later, Strong Armenia Alliance announced that it would accept its parliamentary mandates, arguing that being represented in the National Assembly would be a more effective way to implement these objectives.

The month following the elections did not witness a decline in the intensity of election-related information flows. These post-election flows in the media and on social networks were largely concentrated on the measures of restraint (such as the restriction on Armenia Alliance leader Robert Kocharyan leaving the country and the arrest of Prosperous Armenia Party leader Gagik Tsarukyan) taken against the leaders and members of opposition forces. Another topic covered by the media was the accelerated adoption of a package of legislative amendments in the National Assembly. The proposed changes set a new electoral criterion leading to a considerable reduction in the number of RA citizens residing abroad who are eligible to vote in Armenia, effectively restricting the voting rights of this group of citizens.

³⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/share/v/14hHRJNu45W>

CONCLUSIONS

The Peculiarities of the 2026 Electoral Process

The 2026 parliamentary election process in Armenia (including the first post-election month) unfolded with a number of unique developments that distinguished it from all previous national elections.

Thus:

- On the 19th day of the official campaign, one of the political forces (Alliance Party) withdrew from the electoral race.
- The leaders of two political forces participated in the campaign while deprived of their liberty: one was under house arrest in Armenia (Samvel Karapetyan, Strong Armenia Alliance), and the other (Vardan Ghukasyan, Democracy, Law, and Discipline Party) was in a prison in the United States.
- The leader of one political force (Gagik Tsarukyan, Prosperous Armenia Party) sued the leader of another political force (Nikol Pashinyan, Civil Contract Party) claiming he had been defamed in pre-election speeches and demanding a public refutation.
- Ahead of the vote, on the last day of the official campaign, one of the participating political forces (Hanrapetutyun Party) applied to the CEC demanding that the registration of another political force (Strong Armenia Alliance) be revoked, thereby preventing votes from being cast in its favor.
- Within a month following the vote, measures of restraint were applied against some leaders of the participating forces: a ban on leaving the country (against Armenia Alliance leader Robert Kocharyan) and detention (against Prosperous Armenia Party leader Gagik Tsarukyan).
- The official voting data were recognized as the results of the elections held throughout the territory of Armenia, excluding the data from three polling stations (the results at these polling stations were annulled due to violations, with no re-vote scheduled).
- Nearly a month after the elections, the RA National Assembly adopted the Law "On Amendments and Supplements to the Constitutional Laws 'Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia' and Law 'On Referendum'" in an accelerated manner. It established a new criterion for the voting right of citizens residing abroad. From now on, the exercise of this right will depend not only on their

citizenship status, but also on whether they have resided in Armenia for at least one year within the two-year period preceding the elections.

The Campaign on Facebook and in the Media

Armenia's current Electoral Code does not prohibit campaigning before the officially established campaign period, while institutional online media outlets, unlike audiovisual media, are not bound by specific legislative requirements (such as ensuring balanced coverage of the campaigns of competing political forces).

For this reason, the monitoring of 3 Armenian (Aravot.am, CivilNet.am, and Factor.am) and two foreign (Azatutyun.am and Sputnik Արմենիա) media outlets focused on the specifics of the coverage of the entire electoral process (intensity, audience reach, thematic emphasis, manifestations of campaign/counter-campaign, and other issues), rather than solely on whether the media maintained a balanced approach toward the participating political forces.

The monitoring of social media pages of all participating (19-1) political forces, in turn, focused on the tools used for campaign/counter-campaign, the intensity of their use, audience reach, and interaction with audiences.

Facebook - At the level of information flows, the 2026 parliamentary election process in Armenia, especially on social media platforms, started nearly half a year ahead of the officially designated campaign deadlines and continued with active post-election developments. A comparison of the materials published by political forces on their social media pages and those appearing in the media during this period (media materials during this period were mainly focused on the electoral process, while social media was already circulating traditional campaign content, such as posts about meetings with citizens in different communities and certain provisions from electoral programs) demonstrates that social media effectively became the starting platform for the 2026 pre-election campaign.

All participating political forces (with the exception of the Meritocratic Party of Armenia) conducted their election campaigns simultaneously across 1 to 6 different social media platforms (Facebook, Youtube, Instagram, Tik-Tok, Telegram, and X), with Facebook remaining the main channel. The preference for Facebook is explained by objective factors that have remained consistent

over the years: Facebook remains the platform with the widest voter presence (64% of Armenia's electorate were Facebook users ahead of the elections), where extensive Armenian-language pre-election content is generated, and where all competing forces, as a rule, maintain a presence, with their engagement becoming increasingly informal with each election. For instance, in the first post-election month, unlike the same stage following previous elections, all political forces continued to keep their political Facebook pages active.

The Facebook pages of the political forces also served as a primary source of information for media outlets. Some political forces (Strong Armenia Alliance and Armenia Alliance) not only shared videos of various campaign meetings and other promotional materials on their Facebook pages, as did the other participating political forces, but also published self-produced interviews and podcast series featuring their leaders.

Election campaigns were built around the speeches of political leaders, with videos presenting various public appearances placing the emphasis mainly on the leaders' statements, some of which included counter-campaign elements, harsh rhetoric, insults and defamation (as was the case with Nikol Pashinyan's speeches on the Civil Contract page, or the various labels used by the leader of Christian-Democratic Rebirth Party in reference to "pro-Russian forces"). The leaders of two participating forces (Meritocratic Party of Armenia and Christian-Democratic Rebirth Party) conducted their Facebook pre-election campaigns through their personal pages and on their own, despite the existence of official pages of these parties.

Did the intensity of pre-election social media campaigning, the indicators of audience reach, reactions and growth dynamics, as well as the formats and sources of content affect election results? This time as well, the answer is negative. A notable example is the National Democratic Alliance, which, despite being among the political forces with the most intensive online campaigning, received less than 1% of the vote. The level of content produced within a single day (up to 58 campaign materials on the Civil Contract page, up to 50 materials on the Armenia Alliance page, up to 33 materials on the National Democratic Alliance page) was comparable to the daily output of a number of Armenian online media outlets. The notable positive dynamics in audience growth likewise had no direct correlation with either campaign intensity or the outcome of the elections. For instance, by the last day of the campaign, Strong Armenia Alliance, which carried out a relatively more intensive campaign on Facebook, recorded follower growth (around

15,000 followers) similar to that of the Prosperous Armenia Party page, which campaigned with lower intensity. Meanwhile, the National Democratic Alliance Facebook page, which was actively updated with new content on a daily basis throughout the campaign, recorded an increase of only 627 followers.

However, a common feature of all political pages was that throughout the campaign they were practically used as channels for campaign/counter-campaign messages, rather than as tools for interactive communication with followers and wider Facebook audiences who were critical of them. Offline meetings served as the main venue for “face-to-face” interaction between political forces and potential voters.

Media - The campaign coverage in the monitored media outlets (despite different editorial approaches to covering the pre-election processes and demonstrating selectivity in some cases regarding the course of campaign days) featured multiple voices. Alongside competing forces and their own journalists, the outlets also presented opinions of other segments of society.

Thus, throughout the campaign, the audience of **Azatutyun.am** could access the views of representatives of 11 competing political forces and 9 other groups. **Sputnik Armenia** presented its audience with statements by representatives of 13 competing forces and 13 other groups. **Aravot.am** provided its audience with statements by all 18 participating political forces (including Alliance Party until its withdrawal from the race) and 17 different groups. During the same period, **Factor.am's** audience could access statements by representatives of all 18 participating political forces and views expressed by representatives of 12 other groups. **Civilnet.am's** audience could access the views of representatives of 16 participating political forces and 8 other groups.

Overall, the media platforms studied, with the exception of **Sputnik Armenia**, featured a quite intensive presence of ordinary citizens, whose views reached these platforms through campaign coverage and accounted for unprecedentedly high indicators. For example, on **Azatutyun.am**, the share of citizens' statements was equal to that of experts/NGO representatives/other specialists, and to the volume of messages of Prosperous Armenia Party and Armenia Alliance. Factor.am displayed a broadly similar pattern. In the materials of Aravot.am, the difference between citizens' statements (9% of all published opinions) and statements of Prosperous Armenia and Civil Contract parties amounted to only 1%. Representatives of Russia accounted for the largest share of “foreign

speakers,” although Azerbaijan and Turkey were no less interested in the outcome of Armenia's elections. Statements by Russian representatives published in the Armenian media included assessments regarding the possible consequences of the election outcome for the country, the interference of the EU, rather than Russia, as well as the restrictions imposed on the import of certain Armenian products during that period. The polyphony of the campaign was also driven by the pre-election discourse that strongly promoted the elections as a historically exceptional event and one of existential significance for Armenia.

The campaign unfolded largely through counter-campaigning against competing forces, with specific forces and figures clearly targeted. On Azatutyun.am and Factor.am, Civil Contract Party and Nikol Pashinyan accounted for the highest number of negative mentions of opponents, while on Aravot.am, the largest share of negative mentions targeting others was directed at Civil Contract and Nikol Pashinyan personally by Strong Armenia and Armenia alliances. Other political forces also contributed to the formation of the counter-campaign environment, but to a much lesser extent. The counter-campaign statements made by political forces contained a wide range of multifaceted and substantive messages, with clear elements of hate speech, insults, and defamation. The scandalous episodes of verbal confrontation that appeared in the media sparked a wave of comments lasting several days. The vast majority of negative mentions across all media outlets were addressed to Civil Contract and Nikol Pashinyan personally (on **Azatutyun.am**, Civil Contract received 67% of all negative mentions, on **Sputnik Armenia** - 82%, on **Aravot.am** - 88%, on **Civilnet.am** - 66%, and on **Factor.am** - 57%). At the same time, according to the statements of political forces, some of them were motivated to participate in the elections by the imperative of a change of government, while others by the imperative of changing the opposition. By the latter term, they referred to replacing the institutional opposition and ensuring the presence in the NA of other actors - namely themselves - rather than former parliamentary forces, alongside the political majority of Civil Contract.

Judging by the thematic rankings of campaign coverage in the media, the elections were more focused on the forms of pre-election competition (campaign atmosphere and use of harsh rhetoric, electoral bribery and other violations, as well as legal measures applied) than on issues of public importance, such as the Karabakh conflict and challenges faced by Artsakh Armenians in Armenia, issues related to the Armenian Apostolic Church, army reform and modernization, and the issue of Armenian captives held in Azerbaijan. Discourses formed around all these contexts had occupied a central place during at least the year preceding the elections.

Security issues, which demonstrated quite high levels of intensity in the media, were discussed in the context of Armenia's foreign policy orientations, the post-war Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement process, and the "either war or peace" dilemma. This dilemma was put before audiences predominantly by competing political forces. The prospect of either Civil Contract or its main rivals (Strong Armenia and Armenia alliances, and Prosperous Armenia Party) assuming power was presented through mutually contrasting security threats. According to Civil Contract, the coming to power of opposition forces would pose a threat to Armenia, while opposition forces argued that the continuation of Civil Contract rule itself would result in disastrous consequences for Armenia. Perceptions of Azerbaijani narratives were also diametrically opposed: Civil Contract representatives argued that the implementation of the "Western Azerbaijan" political thesis lacked any real foundation, whereas opposition forces viewed it as a real expansionist threat for Armenia.

Despite the fact that foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) was among the topics most actively circulated both domestically and internationally ahead of the elections, the level of attention devoted to this issue during the actual electoral process was unexpectedly low. In the media, the coverage of this issue was shaped by competing political forces' statements about external information flows, journalists' identification and presentation of specific examples of such flows (Civilnet.am, Factor.am), and statements by senior Russian and US officials on the matter.

APPENDIX

List of the Studied Facebook Pages of Political Forces

1. National Democratic Alliance - <https://www.facebook.com/NatDemAlliance/>
2. Prosperous Armenia - https://www.facebook.com/bhk2021/?locale=hy_AM
3. Against All - <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582131623107>
4. Democracy, Law, and Discipline - <https://www.facebook.com/DokVardan>
5. Democratic Consolidation - https://www.facebook.com/demconsolidation/?locale=hy_AM
6. Armenian National Congress - https://www.facebook.com/armnatlcongress/?locale=hy_AM
7. Meritocratic Party of Armenia/Gurgen Simonyan Page - <https://www.facebook.com/GurgenSimonyan2>
8. Armenia Alliance - https://www.facebook.com/hayastandashing/?locale=hy_AM
9. Hanrapetutyun - https://www.facebook.com/hanrapetutyunparty/?locale=hy_AM
10. Rally for the Republic - <https://www.facebook.com/Hanunhanrapetutyunparty/>
11. Wings of Unity - <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580809094859>
12. New Power - <https://www.facebook.com/newpower.am>
13. Reformists Party - <https://www.facebook.com/babayanvahan>
14. Strong Armenia - <https://www.facebook.com/strongarmenia.am/>
15. Civil Contract - <https://www.facebook.com/civilcontractarmenia>
16. Kochari National Revival and Awakening of Nation <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61571604247964>
17. Christian-Democratic Rebirth/Levon Shirinyan Page <https://www.facebook.com/levon.shirinyan.5>
18. Bright Armenia - <https://www.facebook.com/BrightArmenia>

Table 1.

Campaign Intensity on Official Facebook Pages of the Participant Political Forces
(08.05 -05.06.2026)

Parties/alliances	Maximum number of posts disseminated in one day	Minimum number of posts disseminated in one day	Number of days with no posts on FB during the official campaign
National Democratic Alliance	33	8	0
Prosperous Armenia	9	0	2
Against All	8	1	0
Democracy, Law, and Discipline	22	2	0
National Democratic Alliance	5	0	12
Bright Armenia	23	1	0
Armenian National Congress	26	2	0
Armenia Alliance	50	14	0
Meritocratic Party of Armenia/Gurgen Simonyan Page	6	0	6
Rally for the Republic	12	1	0
Hanrapetutyun	8	1	0
Wings of Unity	25	4	0
New Power	3	0	9
Strong Armenia	16	3	0
Reformists Party	5	0	7
Civil Contract	58	8	0
Kochari National Revival and Awakening of the Nation	44	0	4
Christian-Democratic Rebirth/Levon Shirinyan Page	11	3	0

Table 2.
Audience dynamics of political forces' Facebook pages as a result of the campaign

Parties/alliances	08.05.2026	05.06.2026	Number of new followers
National Democratic Alliance	95 558	96 185	627
Prosperous Armenia	35 118	51 026	15 908
Against All	4184	6424	2240
Democracy, Law, and Discipline	53 000	55 000	2000
Democratic Consolidation	16 000	16 000	0
Bright Armenia	21 055	21 374	319
Armenian National Congress	15 226	16 542	1316
Armenia Alliance	86 948	89 740	2792
Meritocratic Party of Armenia/Gurgen Simonyan Page	30 000	32 000	2000
Rally for the Republic	31 000	31 000	0
Hanrapetutyun	47 499	51 515	4016
Wings of Unity	24 000	25 000	1000
New Power	3300	3500	200
Strong Armenia	137 000	152 000	15 000
Reformists Party	83	108	25
Civil Contract	162 397	173 225	8828
Kochari National Revival and Awakening of the Nation	267	456	189
Christian-Democratic Rebirth/Levon Shirinyan Page	58 000	58 920	920

Table 3.
Audience engagement ranges of political forces' Facebook pages during the campaign
(Combined likes/shares/comments)
(08.05 -05.06. 2026)

Parties/ alliances	Materials like/share/ comment in 1-100 range	Materials Like/share/ comment in 101-1000 range	Materials Like/share/ comment in 1001-10 000 range	Materials Like/share/ comment in 10 001- 100000 range	Materials Like/share/ comment in 100 001< range
National Democratic Alliance	42	466	20	1	0
Prosperous Armenia	0	99	10	0	0
Against All	16	78	8	0	0
Democracy, Law, and Discipline	10	120	94	0	0
Democratic Consolidation	13	20	0	0	0
Bright Armenia	129	87	14	0	0
Armenian National Congress	85	156	11	0	0
Armenia Alliance	527	307	74	5	0
Meritocratic Party of Armenia/Gurgen Simonyan Page	0	36	13	0	0
Rally for the Republic	74	3	0	0	0
Hanrapetutyun	3	43	39	3	0
Wings of Unity	35	299	3	0	0
New Power	19	15	5	0	0
Strong Armenia	0	86	168	19	0
Reformists Party	38	1	0	0	0
Civil Contract	12	256	358	39	3

Kochari National Revival and Awakening of the Nation	180	16	0	0	0
Christian-Democratic Rebirth/Levon Shirinyan Page	15	154	17	0	0

Table 4.
Who? Who Spoke in the Media During the Official Campaign
(8.05-5.06. 2026)

Media outlet/Who spoke	Azatutyun.am		Sputnik Armenia	
National Democratic Alliance	0	0%	1	0.1%
Representative of a foreign country/organization	14	2%	95	13%
Representative of Artsakh	2	0%	7	1%
Prosperous Armenia	45	8%	39	5%
Against All	1	0%	10	1%
Observer	26	5%	3	0.4%
Representative of church	2	0%	13	2%
Democratic Consolidation	0	0%	1	0.1%
Bright Armenia	15	3%	22	3%
Reporter	66	11%	65	9%
Armenian National Congress	4	1%	6	1%
Armenia Alliance	47	8%	50	7%
Democratic Party of Armenia	0	0%	2	0.2%
Meritocratic Party of Armenia/Gurgen Simonyan Page	1	0.1 %	3	0.4%
Rally for the Republic	3	0.5%	0	0%
Hanrapetutyun	2	0.3%	3	0.4%
Other social/political figure	1	0.1%	14	2%
NGO/expert/other specialist	40	7%	84	11%

President of Armenia	0	0%	1	0.1%
Republican Party of Armenia	0	0%	9	1%
Wings of Unity	17	3%	22	3%
New Power	0	0%	1	0.1%
Strong Armenia	67	12%	59	8%
Security/other official institution	72	13%	114	15%
Reformists Party	0	0%	2	0.2%
Representative of Diaspora	0	0%	1	0.1%
Citizen	39	7%	5	0.6%
Civil Contract	112	19%	116	16%
Total	576	100%	748	100%

Media outlet/Who spoke	Civilnet.am		Factor.am		Aravot.am	
National Democratic Alliance	3	1%	9	1%	16	1%
National revolution Party	0	0%	0	0%	1	0.05%
Alliance	0	0%	0	0%	1	0.05%
The Country to Live	0	0%	0	0%	14	1%
Representative of a foreign country/organization	20	7%	8	1%	80	4%
Representative of Artsakh	9	3%	4	1%	25	1%
Prosperous Armenia	13	4%	40	6%	103	5%
Against All	1	0.3%	19	3%	18	1%
Democracy, Law, and Discipline	2	1%	2	0.2%	5	0.2%
Observer	0	0%	11	2%	38	2%
Representative of church	1	0.3%	1	0.1%	18	1%
Democratic Consolidation	1	0.3%	3	0.4%	4	0.2%
Bright Armenia	4	1%	24	3%	47	2%
Reporter	49	17%	98	14%	155	8%

Communist Party	0	0%	0	0%	1	0.05%
Armenian National Congress	3	1%	11	2%	26	1%
Armenia Alliance	7	2%	50	7%	153	8%
European Party of Armenia	0	0%	1	0.1%	1	0.05%
Meritocratic Party of Armenia	2	1%	7	1%	9	0.4%
Rally for the Republic	1	0.3%	8	1%	18	1%
Hanrapetutyun	5	2%	16	2%	16	1%
Other social/political figure	1	0.3%	0	0%	44	2%
NGO/expert/other specialist	30	10%	25	4%	227	12%
President of Armenia	0	0%	0	0%	4	0.2%
Republican Party of Armenia	0	0%	2	0.2%	49	3%
Wings of Unity	6	2%	23	3%	95	5%
New Power	5	2%	9	1%	10	1%
Strong Armenia	16	5%	48	7%	202	10%
Security/other official institution	45	15%	105	15%	145	8%
Reformists Party	1	0.3%	7	1%	14	1%
Social Democrat Hunchakian Party	0	0%	0	0%	1	0.05%
Representative of Diaspora	3	1%	1	0.1%	10	1%
Tseghakron Party	0	0%	1	0.1%	0	0%
Citizen	12	4%	48	7%	182	9%
Kochari National Revival and Awakening of the Nation	0	0%	5	1%	4	0.2%
Civil Contract	54	18%	101	15%	194	10%
Christian-Democratic Rebirth	0	0%	5	1%	3	0.1%
Total	293	100%	692	100%	1933	100%

Table 5.

About whom. Media coverage of political forces and their leaders during the official campaign (8.05-5.06. 2026)

Number of mentions of political forces	Azatutyun.am		Sputnik Armenia	
National Democratic Alliance	1	0.1%	1	0.1%
Alliance	2	0.3%	3	0.3%
Prosperous Armenia	71	9.5%	78	7.8%
Against All	2	0.3%	10	1%
Democracy, Law, and Discipline	1	0.1%	1	0.1%
Opposition/general reference	11	1.5%	19	1.9%
Democratic Consolidation	1	0.1%	1	0.1%
Former President of Armenia/Levon Ter-Petrosyan	4	0.5%	5	0.5%
Bright Armenia	13	1.7%	11	1.1%
Armenian National Congress	2	0.3%	3	0.3%
Armenia Alliance	30	4.%	32	3.2%
Meritocratic Party of Armenia	2	0.3%	3	0.3%
Rally for the Republic	2	0.3%	2	0.2%
Hanrapetutyun	2	0.3%	5	0.5%
President of Armenia/Vahagn Khachaturyan	1	0.1%	0	0%
Republican Party of Armenia	0	0%	9	0.9%
Wings of Unity	5	0.7%	19	1.9%
New Power	2	0.3%	4	0.4%
Strong Armenia	122	16.4%	122	12.1%
'The three-headed party of war': referring to the Armenia Alliance, Strong Armenia, and Prosperous Armenia	6	0.8%	0	0%

Reformists Party	1	0.1%	1	0.1%
Robert Kocharyan/as former President of Armenia and leader of Armenia Alliance	30	4.0%	18	1.8%
Serzh Sargsyan/former President of Armenia	13	1.7%	7	0.7%
Nikol Pashinyan	127	17.1%	125	12.4%
Political forces/general reference	3	0.4%	19	1.9%
Kochari National Revival and Awakening of the Nation	1	0.1%	1	0.1%
Civil Contract	288	38.7%	505	50.2%
Christian-Democratic Rebirth	1	0.1%	1	0.1%
Total	744	100%	1005	100%

(8.05-5.06. 2026)

Number of mentions of political forces	Civilnet.am		Factor.am		Aravot.am	
National Democratic Alliance	6	1.5%	13	1.1%	21	1%
National Revolutionary Party	0	0%	0	0%	2	0.06%
Alliance	1	0.2%	5	0.4%	7	0.2%
The Country to Live	0	0.0%	0	0%	2	0.06%
Prosperous Armenia	25	6.1%	120	9.8%	146	5%
Against All	6	1.5%	20	1.6%	24	0.7%
Democracy, Law, and Discipline	3	0.7%	3	0.2%	12	0.3%
Opposition/general reference	10	2.4%	36	2.9%	90	3%
Heritage Party	0	0%	0	0%	1	0.03%
Democratic Consolidation	2	0.5%	3	0.2%	6	0.2%
The Democratic Way	0	0%	0	0%	1	0.03%
Levon Ter-Petrosyan/former President of Armenia	1	0.2%	3	0.2%	18	1%
Bright Armenia	7	1.7%	24	2%	27	1%

Armenian National Congress	6	1.5%	12	1.0%	25	1%
Armenia Alliance	8	2%	70	5.7%	106	3%
Meritocratic Party of Armenia	2	0.5%	5	0.4%	23	1%
Rally for the Republic	2	0.5%	6	0.5%	18	1%
Hanrapetutyun	6	1.5%	23	1.9%	26	1%
President of Armenia/Vahagn Khacaturyan	2	0.5%	0	0%	3	0.09%
Republican Party of Armenia	0	0%	3	0.2%	13	0.4%
Marxist Marty	0	0%	0	0%	1	0.03%
Wings of Unity	12	2.9%	33	2.7%	97	3%
Current Prime Minister of Armenia/Nikol Pashinyan	112	27%	164	13.4%	812	26%
New Power	6	1.5%	7	0.6%	16	0.5%
Strong Armenia	65	15.9%	215	17.6%	348	11%
"The three-headed party of war": referring to the Armenia Alliance, Strong Armenia, and Prosperous Armenia	4	1%	15	1%	13	0.4%
Reformists Party	4	1%	5	0.4%	9	0.3%
Robert Kocharyan/as former President of Armenia and the leader of Armenia Alliance	21	5.1%	62	5.1%	101	3%
Serzh Sargsyan/former President of Armenia	6	1.5%	25	2.0%	33	1.1%
Political forces/general reference	5	1.2%	22	1.8%	40	1.3%
Kochari National Revival and Awakening of the Nation	2	0.5%	7	0.6%	18	0.6%
Civil Contract	84	20.5%	319	26.1%	1074	34%
Christian-Democratic Rebirth	1	0.2%	3	0.2%	6	0.2%
Total	409	100%	1223	100%	3139	100%

Table 6.
Connotative indicators in materials published by media outlets (8.05-5.06. 2026)

Media outlet	(0)	(+)	(-)
Azatutyun.am	232	181	612
Sputnik Armenia	482	343	655
Aravot.am	1411	789	2172
Factor.am	202	463	779
Civilnet.am	350	80	291

Table 7.
Who spoke in the media about the others with a negative (-) connotation (8.05-5.06. 2026)

Who spoke with a (-) connotation	Azatutyun.am		Sputnik Armenia	
National Democratic Alliance	0	0%	1	0.1%
Representative of a foreign country/organization	8	1%	74	11%
Representative of Artsakh	2	0.3%	8	1%
Prosperous Armenia	65	11%	47	7%
Against All	1	0.1%	6	1%
Observer	25	4%	1	0.1%
Representative of church	6	1%	6	1%
Bright Armenia	14	2%	31	5%
Reporter	60	10%	39	6%
Armenian National Congress	2	0.3%	7	1%
Armenia Alliance	60	10%	38	6%
Democratic Party of Armenia	0	0%	2	0.3%
Meritocratic Party of Armenia	4	1%	3	0.4%

Rally for the Republic	5	1%	0	0%
Hanrapetutyun	1	0.1%	2	0.3%
Other social/political figure	2	0.3%	16	2%
NGO/expert/other specialist	61	10%	98	15%
Republican Party of Armenia	0	0%	14	2%
Wings of Unity	20	3%	23	4%
Nikol Pashinyan	90	15%	44	7%
New Power	0	0%	3	0.4%
Security/other official institution	45	7%	64	10%
Strong Armenia	67	11%	70	11%
Reformists Party	0	0%	1	0.1%
Robert Kocharyan/as former President of Armenia and the leader of Armenia Alliance	6	1%	40	6%
Serzh Sargsyan/former President of Armenia	0	0%	3	0.4%
Citizen	36	6%	4	1%
Civil Contract	32	5%	10	2%
Total	612	100%	655	100%

(8.05-5.06. 2026)

Who spoke with a (-) connotation	Civilnet.am		Factor.am		Aravot.am	
National Democratic Alliance	5	2%	10	1%	22	1%
National Revolutionary Party	0	0%	0	0%	6	0.3%
Representative of a foreign country/organization	19	7%	3	0.3%	52	2%
The Country to Live	0	0%	0	0%	16	1%
Representative of Artsakh	10	3%	3	0.3%	38	2%
Prosperous Armenia	10	3%	52	7%	156	7%
Against All	0	0%	40	5%	21	1%
Democracy, Law, and Discipline	2	1%	0	0%	6	0.3%
Observer	0	0%	10	1%	22	1%

Representative of church	0	0%	1	0.1%	15	1%
Democratic Consolidation	0	0%	3	0.3%	10	0.4%
Bright Armenia	9	3%	35	4%	74	3%
Reporter	54	19%	32	4%	208	10%
Armenian National Congress	12	4%	13	2%	52	2%
Armenia Alliance	8	3%	78	10%	193	9%
European Party of Armenia	0	0%	1	0.1%	1	0.04%
Meritocratic Party of Armenia	7	2%	14	2%	17	1%
Rally for the Republic	1	0.3%	16	2%	28	1%
Hanrapetutyun	12	4%	24	3%	30	1%
Other social/political figure	1	0.3%	0	0%	65	3%
NGO/expert/other specialist	35	12%	32	4%	211	10%
Republican Party of Armenia	0	0%	1	0.1%	86	4%
Wings of Unity	15	5%	23	3%	90	4%
Niko Pashinyan	18	6%	92	12%	100	5%
New Power	6	2%	12	2%	8	0.3%
Security/other official institution	20	7%	67	9%	37	2%
Strong Armenia	17	5%	63	8%	322	15%
Reformists Party	1	0.3%	7	1%	11	1%
Robert Kocharyan	8	2%	11	1%	73	3%
Diaspora	5	2%	1	0.1%	14	1%
Tseghakron	0	0%	2	0.2%	0	0%
Citizen	8	3%	43	6%	120	6%
Civil Contract	8	3%	80	10%	54	2%
Kochari National Revival and Awakening of the Nation	0	0%	8	1%	8	0.3%
Christian-Democratic Rebirth	0	0%	2	0.2%	6	0.3%
Total	291	100%	779	100%	2172	100%

Table 8.
Media topics in the pre-campaign period (23.04-7.05. 2026)

Media outlet/Topics	Azatutyun.am		Sputnik Armenia	
1. Security	12	6%	16	9%
2. Healthcare	0	0%	0	0%
3. Foreign interference	13	6%	18	11%
4. Foreign policy	19	9%	37	22%
5. Issues of Artsakh Armenians	5	2%	2	1%
6. Army	0	0%	1	0.5%
7. Captives in Azerbaijan	7	3%	9	5%
8. Church	4	2%	3	2%
9. Electoral process	24	12%	21	12%
10. Legal system	1	0.5%	2	1%
11. Rights/freedoms	13	6%	23	14%
12. Electoral bribery/other violations	44	21%	11	6%
13. Corruption	2	1%	0	0%
14. Education/science	0	0%	0	0%
15. Karabakh conflict	1	0.5%	3	2%
16. Migration	0	0%	0	0%
17. Culture	0	0%	1	0.5%
18. Domestic politics	23	11%	6	4%
19. Socio-economics	26	13%	9	5%
20. Sport	0	0%	0	0%
21. Diaspora	2	1%	2	1%
22. Tourism	1	0.5%	0	0%
23. The campaign	10	5%	6	4%
Total	207		170	100%

(23.04-7.05. 2026)

Media outlet/Topics	Civilnet.am		Factor.am		Aravot.am	
1. Security	2	3%	15	6.5%	35	5%
2. Healthcare	0	0%	0	0%	5	1%
3. Foreign interference	9	12.5%	9	4%	34	5%
4. Foreign policy	7	10%	35	15%	106	16%
5. Issues of Artsakh Armenians	1	1%	6	3%	14	2%
6. Army	0	0%	3	1.3%	5	1%
7. Captives in Azerbaijan	1	1%	6	3%	20	3%
8. Church	2	3%	4	2%	27	4%
9. Electoral process	17	24%	41	18%	121	19%
10. Legal system	0	0%	3	1.3%	20	3%
11. Rights/freedoms	2	3%	8	3%	28	4%
12. Electoral bribery/other violations	12	17%	21	9%	42	6%
13. Corruption	1	1%	0	0%	3	0.4%
14. Education/science	1	1%	1	0.4%	12	2%
15. Karabakh conflict	5	7%	1	0.4%	16	2%
16. Migration	0	0%	0	0%	3	0.4%
17. Culture	0	0%	1	0.4%	13	2%
18. Domestic politics	3	4%	59	26%	56	9%
19. Socio-economics	4	5.5%	10	4%	46	7%
20. Sport	0	0%	0	0%	2	0.3%
21. Diaspora	0	0%	2	0.8%	3	0.4%
22. Tourism	0	0%	0	0%	2	0.3%
23. The Campaign	5	7%	4	1.7%	39	6%
Total	72	100%	229	100%	652	100%

Table 9.
Media topics during the official campaign (8.05-5.06. 2026)

Media outlet/Who spoke	Azatutyun.am		Sputnik Armenia	
1. Security	77	10%	72	9%
2. Healthcare	5	1%	0	0%
3. Foreign policy	102	13%	158	19%
4. Foreign interference	43	5%	33	4%
5. Issues of Artsakh Armenians	6	1%	3	0.3%
6. Army	16	2%	11	1%
7. Captives in Azerbaijan	8	1%	16	2%
8. Church	10	1.2%	10	1%
9. Electoral process	3	0.3%	46	5%
10. Electoral bribery/other violations	156	20%	80	9%
11. Legal system	96	12%	88	10%
12. Rights/freedoms	25	3%	61	7%
13. Corruption	3	0.3%	3	0.3%
14. Education/science	9	1.1%	3	0.3%
15. Karabakh conflict	28	4%	11	1%
16. Migration	0	0%	0	0%
17. Culture	0	0%	2	0.2%
18. Domestic politics	26	3%	22	3%
19. Socio-economics	55	7%	96	11%
20. Sport	0	0%	1	0.1%
21. Diaspora	0	0%	0	0%
22. Tourism	4	1%	1	0.1%
23. The campaign	114	15%	127	15%
Total	786	100%	844	100%

(8.05-5.06. 2026)

Media outlet	Civilnet.am		Factor.am		Aravot.am	
1. Security	13	3%	92	10%	355	12%
2. Healthcare	2	0.4%	15	2%	15	0.5%
3. Foreign interference	46	10%	16	2%	81	3%
4. Foreign policy	92	20%	83	9%	277	9%
5. Issues of Artsakh Armenians	9	2%	6	1%	72	2%
6. Army	12	3%	23	2%	79	3%
7. Captives in Azerbaijan	4	1%	9	1%	47	2%
8. Church	8	2%	1	0%	48	2%
9. Electoral process	34	7%	70	7%	258	9%
10. Electoral bribery/other violations	39	8%	97	10%	223	8%
11. Legal system	40	9%	86	9%	217	7%
12. Rights/freedoms	22	5%	2	0%	52	2%
13. Corruption	4	1%	1	0%	18	0.6%
14. Education	3	1%	20	2%	52	2%
15. Karabakh conflict	36	8%	9	1%	74	3%
16. Migration	0	0%	0	0%	13	0.4%
17. Culture	0	0%	0	0%	20	0.7%
18. Domestic politics	34	7%	216	23%	367	13%
19. Socio-economics	20	4%	73	8%	263	9%
20. Sport	0	0%	5	1%	7	0.2%
21. Diaspora	1	0.2%	6	1%	11	0.3%
22. Tourism	3	1%	5	1%	12	0.4%
23. The campaign	40	9%	116	12%	335	11%
Total	462	100%	951	100%	2896	100%