



THE PECULIARITIES OF USING SOCIAL NETWORK POSTS BY THE ONLINE MEDIA IN ARMENIA – 2022

(RESULTS OF MONITORING OF 12 ARMENIAN ONLINE MEDIA OUTLETS)

YEREVAN – 2022

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“Region” research center



European Endowment for Democracy (EED)

ON THE STUDY

- **What and who are the social network posts reproduced/used by the Armenian online media about?**
- **What are the peculiarities of publishing social network posts on media platforms?**
- **Whether the copied social network posts contribute to diversification of topics and sources of information in the media?**
- **Which social networks serve as sources of information in the course of presenting the events/developments in Armenia, Artsakh and other countries via social network posts?**

To provide clear answers to these questions we undertook a study of the peculiarities of the usage of social network posts by 12 online media outlets (1in.am, Tert.am, Armlur.am, Hraparak.am, Yerevan.Today, Freenews.am, Armtimes.com, Lragir.am, Aravot.am, Civilnet.am, Aliqmedia.am, Ilur.am).

We selected this group of the media outlets out of the necessity to study media outlets with varied political preferences, as well as the fact that the managers of these media outlets, excluding Freenews.am, had earlier participated in our previous study¹ and also answered our questions regarding the use of social network content.

See the Appendix, Excerpts from the Results of the Survey among Media Managers.

This study was also of interest to us to the extent that by virtue of a 2014 study on approximately similar subject we were able to record that at the time the social network content in the Armenian online media outlets constituted but a tiny part of the media products in Armenia (for example, in case of the online media they constituted about 5% of the overall number of the publications). We also recorded that they were incomparably more about Armenia and the Karabakh conflict,² rather than actual events taking place in other countries and the

¹ [“The Armenian Media in the Epoch of Social Networks – 2022. the Results of the Survey among 100 Media Managers”](#), page 10

² [“Social Media as a Source of Information for the Armenian Media: Standards Shaped and the Practice Applied,”](#) pages 27, 30, 31

international arena. 8 years ago, the interpenetration between the Armenian media and the social networks, Facebook in particular was just beginning to evolve.

We started the study below at the beginning of 2022 and within 1.5 months (January 5 – February 20) when apart from the short internal clashes in Kazakhstan no other tensions were taking place. The war between Russia and Ukraine and the breach of the line of contact by the Azerbaijani armed forces on March 24, the military clashes with the Armenian forces and the post-war escalation motivated us to continue the study for another two weeks (March 24 – April 7).

Hence, the study has two stages: the stage of ‘five minutes’ to the military escalation in Arsakh/the war against Ukraine and the stage of the two weeks of the military escalation in Artsakh/the war against Ukraine.

METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINE

- We considered as social network publications all the materials in online media fully or partially rendering the posts of various social network users.
- We considered as social network materials also those media publications that did not have references to social networks but had some evidence of being taken from social networks (‘sb wrote,’ ‘sb mentioned in social networks,’ ‘sb wrote in his/her microblog,’ etc.)
- The topics of the social network posts published in the media we calculated on the basis of the principle of ‘one post – one and more topic.’
- The number of the authors of the social network posts published in the media outlets (Who speaks) we calculated on the basis of the principle ‘one post – one author.’
- References to others in the posts published in the media (Who this post is about), we calculated on the basis of the principle ‘one post – one and more references to others.’

INTENSITY

The principal peculiarity of this question is that the scale of publications of social network posts in the media are absolutely unrelated to the nature of the current situations. Both at the time of relatively peaceful periods and at times of tensions the list of the media outlets that intensively publish social network posts do not differ much. And the media outlets rarely publishing social network posts do not increase their number on their platforms at times of tensions.

Thus, there are media outlets in which a tangible part of all publications between January 5 – February 20, are the posts reproduced from social networks. This is particularly true of Yerevan.Today.am. 1/5 (21%) of all its publications in the mentioned timeslot were the posts taken from social networks. Social networks content was more extensively used by Armtimes.com (12% of all publications), Hraparak.am (10%), Aravot.am (8%), 1in.am (7%) compared with others.

The maximum number of the social network posts reproduced/used by these media outlets per day was 16-22.

Of average intensity were the posts taken from social networks and published by Lragir.am and Tert.am ³ (6% and 5% of all publications, respectively).

There was comparatively less attention to such content by 5 other media outlets within our list. Their share in all publications on Armlur.am, AliqMedia.am, Civilnet.am, Freenews.am, Ilur.am did not exceed 3%.


These groups of media outlets reproducing/using posts from social networks most and least did not change in the second stage of our study – the period of escalation of the Karabakh conflict and the Russian-Ukrainian war (24.03 – 7.04.22). This proves that the media in

³ In case of Tert.am it should be taken into account that this media outlet had a two-week period of suspension due to the decision of the founding company 'Qaryak Media' and at the end of February continued its activities as an independent media outlet.


principle have different approaches to taking social network content to their platforms. There are media outlets that do this with higher intensity, while there are others that do this rarely in relatively calm and tense periods.

See the charts below, as well as the Appendix, Tables 1 and 2.

The Number of Social Network Posts in the Media Outlets (5.01-20.02, 2022)



The Maximum Number of Social Network Posts Published Daily (5.01-20.02, 2022)



WHOSE POSTS

Who were the authors of the reproduced social network posts? Whose words posted on social networks on different occasions and on what topics were circulated by the media, thus giving a nature of institutional content also to the posts of unofficial users?

- The first evident peculiarity is that the majority of authors of the social network posts on various important events and processes published in the media outlets were Armenian users. The attention of the Armenian media outlets is focused on imparting the Armenian opinions also via social networks. The publication of social network posts on processes and events of importance to Armenia does not contribute to the diversification of opinions and of the authors expressing them on media platforms.

Thus, according to the **records of the first stage (January 5 – February 20, 2022)** the authors of 95% of the posts reproduced/used on Yerevan.Today and Hraparak.am, 93% on Civilnet.am, 84% on Armtimes.com and Armlur.am, 77% on Aravot.am, 74% on Freenews.am, 70% on Lragir.am, 68% on Ilur.am, 63% on Tert.am were Armenian users.

The opinions of members of the Government, parliamentary and extraparliamentary political forces, individual public/political figures and experts normally transmitted by the media via interviews, press conferences, reportages, etc., are being additionally multiplied by means of reproducing/using their social network posts in the media.

For instance, it is a fact that in the context of important issues and especially tense developments the speech of diverse experts and individual public/political figures is overwhelmingly reflected in the media. However, in conformity with the data of our research, it is the social network posts of the representatives of this group (we conditionally called them experts) that were published by the media most.

In this stage, the authors of about half of the social network content copied on the media on the subject of Russian-Ukrainian conflict preceding the war (44%) were again the Armenian users (exclusively from Facebook). The authors of the other half (56%) were the representatives of other countries and international organisations on Twitter, Telegram, and less on Facebook.

The social network content on the subject of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine preceding the war in the media were of two categories. In the first category was the content reflecting the challenges and opportunities for Armenia and other countries in the region in the context of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, possibilities of the impact thereof on Karabakh conflict. And all such posts were taken from the social network platforms of users from Armenia and Artsakh. This was the practice of Aravot.am, Yerevan.Today, Hraparak.am.


In the other category were the social network posts reflecting mostly the daily news on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The authors of these posts were the representatives of other countries/international organisations, various foreign social network information platforms. Such posts were published by 1in.am, Armtimes.com, Freenews.am, Lragir.am, Tert.am. The remaining media outlets published comparatively fewer posts on this subject.

From March 24, tensions in Karabakh and the two weeks of the Russian-Ukrainian war (**the second stage of the study**) demonstrate that:

- The authors of the majority of the social network posts in the context of the Karabakh conflict were again representatives from Armenia and Artsakh in a situation when the non-social-network publications in this context were again based on the opinions of Armenian.
- The social network posts on the Russian-Ukrainian war reflected overwhelmingly the posts of foreign users.

See the chart below, as well as the Appendix, Tables 4 and 5.

Whose Posts Were Published in the Media Outlets in the Tense Situations



- The second peculiarity is that in case of the media outlets using social network content at large scale the publication of the posts of this or that user mostly depends on political preferences and support - being the proponent of this or that political force.

Thus, for example, the social network posts of the parliamentary opposition were mostly copied by the media acting for the opposition: the posts of the representatives of the parliamentary faction 'Hayastan' were mostly copied by Yerevan.Today (21%), Hraparak.am (16%). The posts of the representatives of the 'With Honor' faction – mostly by Armlur.am (38%), Hraparak.am (21%), Yerevan.Today (18%), Tert.am (14%).

Although the majority of the mass media copy for the most part the official information circulated on Facebook, the mass media outlets connected mostly with the authorities published for the most part the posts of the representatives of the authorities, and the public administration. Not less among them are the social network speeches in the context of verbal resistance to the opposition. Thus, the social network posts of the representatives of various governmental circles were published more by Armtimes.com (35%) and Freenews.am (18%).

While, for example, the number of publications of the social network posts of the HRD of RA of that moment, critical of the governmental activities in the context of especially the Karabakh conflict and human rights in the same Armtimes.com was as many (0,6% of all social network posts) as in Aliqmedia.am, which generally publishes social network posts less than others (0,6%).

It should also be stressed that the publication of the social network posts of experts in many cases also has directly to do with political considerations: the assessments of the representatives of societal and expert groups with oppositional views were reflected on the platforms of the media outlets with oppositional views, and the opposite, the posts of experts loyal to the governmental policy or less critical thereof – in Armtimes.com and Freenews.am.

See the Appendix, Table 6.

WHO ABOUT, ON WHAT TOPICS

- The peculiarity of the response to this question is that regardless of the nature of the situation (relatively calm, or tense internal situation or external politics) the Armenian discourse on most important topics reflected overwhelmingly references to foreign rather than Armenian actors. This is especially striking at times of escalations of the conflict of Karabakh.

According to our data in **the first stage** of the study, only 2 out of 12 media outlets published overwhelmingly social network posts on Armenia and Artsakh (Ilur.am – 83%, Civilnet.am –67%).


In another category are the 4 media outlets, which published overwhelmingly social network posts on other countries and international organisations (Aliqmedia.am – 84%, Tert.am – 75%, Lragir.am – 71%, 1in.am – 60%), although these publications on other countries and international organisations, unlike the publications on Armenia and Artsakh, were mainly on events. For example, such were the social networks posts published in the media at the beginning of January, which were mainly on the internal political clashes in Kazakhstan, the involvement of the CSTO in the process and the tensions between Russia and Ukraine.

In the third category are the media outlets, which reproduced social network content on the Armenian/Artsakh and international events proportionately. In this category are Yerevan.Today, Hraparak.am, Aravot.am, Armtimes.com, Freenews.am, Armlur.am.


All the mass media reproduced considerably fewer social network posts about events, problems, developments in the Armenian Diaspora. They did not exceed 1% of the reproduced social network posts in the period of the study.

See the charts below.


On Armenia/Artsakh




On Other Countries



On International Organizations




On the Diaspora



The list of other countries referred to in re-published social network posts is impressive by its size (we refer to the events, incidents, political and societal developments, private life of public figures, etc in 56 countries).

However, in terms of the information of public importance the media outlets copied predominantly social network content related to Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey.

See the chart below.



In the social network posts in the context of the Karabakh conflict the peculiarity that we detected in the Armenian political discourse following the 2020 war was preserved is that a significant share in public speeches belongs to the opinions on the positions of foreign actors, other states.⁴

For example, at the stage of escalation of the Karabakh conflict (March 24 – April 7) references to foreign actors in the social network posts published by the mass media outlets made half (50.5%) of references to all other actors, while references to Armenia and Artsakh as actors altogether made 41 %. Considerably less were the references to international organisations as actors (7%).

See the Appendix, Tables 7 and 8.

ON WHAT TOPICS

Of 23 diverse topics in the social network posts used in the first stage, 5 topics were referred to more:

- Internal political issues (14%),
- Legal/judicial system issues (12%),
- Security/army issues (11%),
- Karabakh conflict issues (10%),
- Foreign policy issues (7%).

Moreover:

- The topic of the internal political issues was addressed more by experts/NGO representatives/individual specialists, and then only representatives of the parliamentary forces in their social network posts.

⁴ See “the Context of the Conflict and Development Perspectives in the Elections, 2021” , page 24

- The topic of the issues related to the legal/judicial system was addressed more again by experts/ NGO representatives, individual specialists. However, this time they related mostly to diverse criminal and judicial cases, while the media outlets published the social network posts of various specialists (advocates, other lawyers) in these cases. On this subject the social network posts of the representatives of 'Hayastan' faction were published most from among the political forces.
- The topics of the security/army and the Karabakh conflict are the two topics that were touched mostly by the media publications reposting the social network posts of the representatives of 'With Honor' and 'Hayastan' factions and the official and non-official representatives of Artsakh.


See the Appendix, Table 9.

At the Stage of the Russian-Ukrainian War and the Escalation of the Karabakh Conflict

We paid a special attention in our study to the use of the social network posts in the media in these two tense situations when the war between Russia and Ukraine was already one month old, and the military clashes in Artsakh were just started (24.03-7.04.2022). Certainly, it can be assumed at first sight that addressing the subject of Karabakh considerably more than other topics also by means of social network posts was conditioned by this phenomenon. Normally, new tensions are covered more intensively even if they continue occurring at the same time with other tense processes.

See the Chart below.


The Volume of Social Network Posts in the Media in Time of Tensions



However, on the other hand, along with these two tense situations the media reproduced/used social network posts on a number of other topics. They collectively exceeded the number of coverages of such important issues as the war between Russia and Ukraine and the possible consequences of it on the realities of the Karabakh conflict.

See the Chart below.

**The Number of Social Network Materials
24.03-07.04,2022**



■ On the Russian-Ukrainian war ■ On the Karabakh conflict ■ On other topics


WHICH SOCIAL NETWORKS FROM AND HOW

- The first unequivocal response to these questions is that Facebook is the source of information for the online Armenian media. This is the case for both Armenian events and during the stages of Armenian-Azerbaijani escalations. The materials of other social networks (mainly Twitter and Telegram) are used mainly when presenting the events in other countries.

Thus, although in the first stage of the study (January 5 – February 20) we recorded the fact of publication of the posts of 8 various social network users, the Facebook posts constituted 83% of all social network posts. Facebook was a source of primary information for all media outlets subject to this study.

The number of the publications reproduced/used from other social networks is considerably fewer.

See the Chart below, as well as the Appendix, Table 10.



At the stage of the escalation of the Karabakh conflict the overwhelming majority of social networks on this topic were again the Facebook posts. The second and third places were occupied, as at the time of relative calmness, were the posts of the users of Twitter and Telegram.

See the Appendix, Table 11.

In the course of the two weeks of the Russian-Ukrainian war this unequivocal priority of Facebook was wavered as a result of the almost equal use of the posts from Twitter and Telegram.

See the Appendix, Table 12.

- The second peculiarity is that the social network posts are used with the same titles simultaneously in a number of media outlets, thereby shadowing the exclusivity of the content. Meantime, the non-Facebook posts on events in other countries are represented sometimes by dual or even triple references.

For example, 25 pre-war social network posts on Ukraine were posted in two and more media outlets under the same titles or by entirely repeated texts.⁵

The social network posts on events in different countries in the majority of cases are reflected in the Armenian media outlets with dual or even triple links. For example, according to Armenpress, 'This was posted via «Власть о главном» Telegram channel by referring to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan⁶', ' This was posted by TASS referring to the Globalcheck Telegram Channel'⁷, 'As RIA-Novosti informs' says Ukraine's representative Vsevolod Chentsov in his Twitter microblogue,⁸ etc.

⁵ See 'Avakov warned Zelenski' (a publication with such a title was published in Lragir.am, 1in.am on 22.01.22, as well as in a number of other media outlets, which were not the object of our monitoring), 'the Prime Minister of Ukraine assigned a revision of the norms related to military registration of women' (the post with this title was published in Tert.am, 1in.am on 21.01.22, as well as in a number of other media outlets, which were not covered by our study), the publication with the following title 'The situation around Ukraine Is Becoming More and More Worrying. Johnson' was published simultaneously in Armtimes.com, Freenews.am, 30.01.22, as well as in a number of other media outlets that were not the object of our monitoring, etc.

⁶ 'About 4000 people were arrested in Kazakhstan', Tert.am, 08.01.22

⁷ 'The Internet is again unreachable in Kazakhstan', 1in.am, 08.01.22


⁸ Ukraine, EU and NATO tried a new format for discussing security issues, Lragir.am, 03.02.22

- The third peculiarity was the publication of this kind of posts with non-definite social network references. When a publication specifies/hints at its social network origin, but does not specify which of the current social networks was referred to.

Thus, 5% of the social network posts in the media were the materials which did not contain specific references to social networks. These are the cases when the media outlet published the post of even famous users without indicating the concrete name of the social network only indicating that the post was taken from a social network by using such formulations as 'this person wrote,' 'this person indicated in his/her social microblog,' etc. A sustainable practice of publishing posts with indefinite references to social networks was observed with Armlur.am (62% of the reposted materials were such that did not contain an indication of the name of the social network), Lragir.am (42%) and 1in.am (14%). Meantime, Hraparak.am, Aravot.am, Aliqmedia.am, Ilur.am and Civilnet.am reproduced social network content by clearly indicating the name of the definite social network.

See the Charts below.

Publications with Specific/Non-Specific References to Social Network Sources (5.01 - 20.02, 2022)




- The fourth peculiarity is that the social network content is being published by means of simple reposts, as well as by means of own publications and commentary. Moreover, the media outlets publishing social network posts more than the rest resort to simple reposts more than the rest. And on the contrary, the media outlets which rarely publish social network content, publish them more in the light of their own commentary.

Thus, in all the media outlets, apart from Aliqmedia.am (which is among the media outlets rarely using social network posts), the social network posts were used by means of simple reposting and adding own commentary/supplements to the latter.

- The social network information/post reflected in Aliqmedia.am was published exclusively as part of their own posts.
- Armtimes.com, Yerevan.Today, Aravot.am, Hraparak.am, Ilur.am, Lragir.am, 1in.am, Tert.am overwhelmingly just reproduced social network posts.
- The number of social network posts and publications with own commentary in Freenews.am was approximately the same.
- The opposite picture was registered at Civilnet.am and Armlur.am. Only 1/5 of the social network posts were presented to the audiences via simple reposting.

See the Chart below.

How the Social Network Posts Were Reproduced (5.01 - 20.02, 2022)



APPENDIX

Excerpts from the Survey among the Media Managers (January 2022)

Media outlet	What is your attitude to the practice of reproducing/using social network content in traditional media?	Describe the practice of using social network posts in your media outlets
1in.am	Positive, I do not see any problem.	We repost mainly the posts of the expert, political and civil society circles, environmental alerts.
Aravot.am	We have to deal with this practice of the authorities, we didn't have enough strength to change this. We have to work in such conditions... In other words, I do not see this as normal but we think that this is the reality.	... We have certain restrictions. We take exclusively the posts of public figures, speakers. In case of the posts of public figures take it or leave it you have about 10 posts per day. We bring the views of party leaders, famous experts to our platform. We do not quote regular users. If news from bordering villages is reported, (we publish) by working thereon.
Armlur.am	Normally we avoid reproducing (social network posts).	Our media outlet reproduces social network posts only in cases when this was done by public officials and there is no other source to verify this important information.

Armtimes.com	Contemporary media cannot stay away from reproducing social network content, since this content oftentimes becomes a source of acquisition of important information. This is important in terms of the media outlet being able to impart information to the audience faster.	Special importance is attached to the accuracy, content and urgency of the published information. Its publication is conditioned by the urgency of the information and the need to impart the necessary information to the audience. Posts that do not comply with the principles adopted by Armtimes.com, which contain indecent language, insults, swear words are reformulated if such a need arises.
Civilnet.am	This is an indispensable element of our lives. However, it is unacceptable when the media outlets transform a certain post to an 'article.' without any context.	There is a big problem in Armenia – very often state institutions and public officials deem Facebook as a primary source of information. We cannot neglect this.
Hraparak.am In general, our attitude is normal but it is important who is the author.We almost never take the posts of users without additional journalistic work. We have a practice of reposting but we work on posts if this does not concern public figures.
Lragir.am	We cannot allow ourselves reposting from social networks.	We do not have a practice of reposting, except for the posts of renowned experts, which we repost by making references to their pages.
Yerevan.Today	Our attitude is quite positive if it is from a reliable source... Public figures recently express their views in the social networks,	We use this in our media outlet almost on a daily basis. Our media outlet operates in a domain against the current government

	<p>preferring this to interviews or press releases. This may be used by different media outlets as different to interviews which not all media outlets may repost.</p>	<p>and I believe it is not difficult to guess what kind of social network posts we can repost. We place an emphasis on reasonable and accurate information. We never post fake news and posts.:</p>
Ilur.am	<p>They may be found in different mass media only in very concrete cases if this is about exclusive information on the activities of a very prominent person.</p>	<p>Our media outlet has constantly applied this approach, also that we do not repost the content by unknown people especially if this content is suspicious or easily retractable. We normally avoid reposting fake users.</p>
Aliqmedia.am	<p>Negative</p>	<p>We exclude this from our practice, only via official pages.</p>
Tert.am	<p>Positive, if we speak of authoritative analytics, scholars, parties, political figures or posts on the official pages of public authorities.</p>	<p>This practice is on average applied in our media outlet. We do not repost manifestly Azerbaijani propaganda, unverified information, personal insults, threats, swearigs, information disseminated by an unknown (unidentified source) Telegram channel.</p>

**Table 1. The Share of the Published Social Network Posts in the Online Media Outlets
(5.01-20.02, 2022)**

Media outlet	Number of all posts (5.01- 20.02)	Number of social network posts (5.01- 20.02)	The share of the social network posts % (5.01- 20.02)
Yerevan.Today	2678	554	21%
Armtimes.com	2796	337	12%
Hraparak.am	3717	387	10%
Aravot.am	3767	317	8%
1in.am	5889	438	7%
Lragir.am	2401	139	6%
Tert.am	3238	155	5%
Ilur.am	591	19	3%
Freeneews.am	5716	166	3%
Civilnet.am	611	13	2%
AliqMedia.am	898	15	2%
Armlur.am	2536	13	0.5%
Total	34838	2553	7%

**Table 2. The Number of the Published Social Network Posts in the Online Media Outlets
(24.03-7.04, 2022)**

Media outlet	Number of social network posts	Inlcuding on the Russian-Ukrainian war topic /%	Including on the Karabakh conflict topic %	Including on other topics /%
Yerevan.Today	169	2%	67%	31%
Armtimes.com	140	4%	34%	62%
1in.am	117	22%	40%	38%
Aravot.am	105	7%	74%	19%
Hraparak.am	104	4%	64%	32%
Tert.am	69	29%	57%	14%
Lragir.am	52	21%	53%	26%
Freeneews.am	52	4%	52%	44%
Armlur.am	8	0%	100%	0%
Civilnet.am	5	0%	80%	20%
llur.am	2	0%	0%	100%
AliqMedia.am	0	0%	0%	0%
Total	823	10%	56%	34%

**Table 3. Authors of the Reproduced/Used Social Network Posts
(5.01-20.02, 2022)**

Media outlet	User/ social network	Posts without specific reference to a social network	Facebook	Twitter	Telegram	YouTube	Instagram	TikTok	VK	Linkedin	Total
1in.am	Armenian user	56	244	4	1	1	2	0	3	0	311 71%
	Artsakh user	2	16	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	19 4%
	Foreign user	2	22	71	12	1	3	0	0	1	112 25%
	Total	60	282	75	14	2	5	0	3	1	442 100%
Tert.am	Armenian user	1	90	5	2	0	0	1	0	0	99 63%
	Artsakh user	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5 3%
	Foreign user	0	6	35	4	0	8	0	0	0	53 34%
	Total	3	99	40	6	0	8	1	0	0	157 100%
Lragir.am	Armenian user	55	39	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	98 70%
	Artsakh user	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	6 4%
	Foreign user	0	8	27	2	0	0	0	0	0	37 26%
	Total	59	48	28	4	1	0	1	0	0	141 100%

Freenews.am	Armenian user	1	120	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	126 74%
	Artsakh user	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7 4%
	Foreign user	0	10	20	5	0	2	0	0	0	37 22%
	Total	1	137	22	5	0	5	0	0	0	170 100%
Armtimes.com	Armenian user	1	281	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	287 84%
	Artsakh user	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20 6%
	Foreign user	0	11	14	8	0	2	0	0	0	35 10%
	Total	1	312	16	8	0	5	0	0	0	342 100%
Yerevan.Today	Armenian user	4	520	0	2	2	1	1	0	0	530 95%
	Artsakh user	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16 3%
	Foreign user	0	4	5	3	0	0	0	0	0	12 2%
	Total	4	540	5	5	2	1	1	0	0	558 100%
Aravot.am	Armenian user	0	243	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	247 77%
	Artsakh user	0	59	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	59 18%
	Foreign user	0	7	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	13 4%
	Total	0	309	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	319 100%
AliqMedia.am	Armenian user	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7 47%
	Artsakh user	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0%

	Foreign user	0	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	8 53%
	Total	0	8	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	15 100%
Ilur.am	Armenian user	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13 68%
	Artsakh user	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 11%
	Foreign user	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 21%
	Total	0	16	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	19 100%
Armlur.am	Armenian user	8	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	11 84%
	Artsakh user	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 8%
	Foreign user	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 8%
	Total	8	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	13 100%
Hraparak.am	Armenian user	0	377	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	379 95%
	Artsakh user	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16 4%
	Foreign user	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 1%
	Total	0	395	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	397 100%
Civilnet.am	Armenian user	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13 93%
	Artsakh user	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 7%
	Foreign user	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0%
	Total	0	13	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	14 100%

Total	Armenian user	126	1948	14	12	4	9	5	3	0	2121 82%
	Artsakh user	8	141	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	152 6%
	Foreign user	2	72	189	34	1	15	0	0	1	314 12%
	Total	136	2161	203	49	5	24	5	3	1	2587 100%

Table 4. Whose Posts on the Russian-Ukrainian War Were Published in the Media Outlets (24.03 –7.04, 2022)

Media outlet	Representatives of Armenia		Representatives of other countries		Representatives of international organizations		Total	
1in.am	2	12,5%	22	36%	2	67%	26	32%
Hraparak.am	2	12,5%	2	3%	0	0%	4	5%
Tert.am	2	12,5%	18	30%	0	0%	20	25%
Aravot.am	5	31%	2	3%	0	0%	7	9%
Yerevan.Today	2	12,5%	2	3%	0	0%	4	5%
Lragir.am	1	6%	9	15%	1	33%	11	14%
Freenews.am	1	6%	1	2%	0	0%	2	3%
Armlur.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Armtimes.com	1	6%	5	8%	0	0%	6	7%
AliqMedia.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Civilnet.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Ilur.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total	16	100%	61	100%	3	100%	80	100%

**Table 5. Whose Posts on the Karabakh Conflict Were Published in the Media Outlets
(24.03 –7.04, 2022)**

Media outlet	Representatives of Armenia		Representatives of Artsakh		Representatives of other countries		Representatives of international organizations		Representatives of Diaspora		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
1in.am	21	7%	8	9%	10	21%	6	25%	2	67%	47	10%
Hraparak.am	54	18%	13	14%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	67	15%
Tert.am	20	7%	10	11%	6	13%	3	12,5%	0	0%	39	8%
Aravot.am	47	16%	23	25%	5	11%	3	12,5%	0	0%	78	17%
Yerevan. Today	91	31%	17	18%	3	6%	3	12,5%	0	0%	114	25%
Lragir.am	11	4%	4	4%	8	19%	4	17%	0	0%	27	6%
Freeneews.am	14	5%	5	5%	7	15%	1	4%	0	0%	27	6%
Armlur.am	4	1%	4	4%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	8	2%
Armtimes.com	30	10%	7	8%	7	15%	3	12,5%	1	33%	48	10%
AliqMedia.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Civilnet.am	2	1%	1	1%	0	0%	1	4%	0	0%	4	1%
Ilur.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total	294	100%	92	100%	46	100%	24	100%	3	100%	459	100%

**Table 6. Whose Social Network Posts Were Used/Reproduced Most in the Media Outlets
(5.01-20.02, 2022)**

Whose posts	1in. am	Lragir. am	Armtimes. com	Yerevan Today	Aravot. am	Tert. am	AliqMedia. am	Civilnet. am	Freenevs. am	Ilur. am	Armlur. am	Hraparak. am	Total
Expert	65	14	16	151	62	13	1	1	7	4	0	125	459
	15%	10%	5%	27%	19%	8%	7%	7%	4%	21%	0%	32%	18%
Government	73	20	121	16	47	13	1	4	31	0	0	6	332
	17%	14%	35%	3%	15%	8%	7%	29%	18%	0%	0%	2%	13%
”Hayastan” faction	2	1	0	116	19	8	0	1	1	0	0	62	210
	0.5%	1%	0%	21%	6%	5%	0%	7%	0.6%	0%	0%	16%	8%
Artsakh representative	19	6	20	16	59	5	0	1	7	2	1	16	152
	4%	4%	6%	3%	18%	3%	0%	7%	4 %	10%	8%	4%	6%
“With Honor” faction	1	4	1	101	22	22	0	0	1	0	5	82	239
	0.2%	3%	0.3%	18%	7%	14%	0%	0%	0.6%	0%	38%	21%	9%
RA Human Rights Defender	26	28	2	29	16	20	2	0	1	0	2	1	127
	6%	20%	1%	5%	5%	13%	13%	0%	0.6%	0%	15%	0.3%	5%
“Civil Contract” party	35	4	32	5	13	2	0	0	13	0	0	5	109
	8%	3%	9%	1%	4%	1%	0%	0%	8%	0%	0%	1%	4%
Non-political agency	23	9	36	9	7	5	1	0	11	0	0	3	104
	5%	6%	10%	2%	2%	3%	7%	0%	6%	0%	0%	1%	4%
Territorial Administration	19	4	45	7	10	2	0	0	11	0	0	3	101
	4%	3%	13%	1%	3%	1%	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	1%	4%
Ordinary user	19	1	3	28	3	9	2	0	3	6	0	17	91

	4%	1%	1%	5%	1%	6%	13%	0%	2%	32%	0%	4%	3%
Individual political/public figure	5	0	1	17	9	1	0	0	1	0	1	15	50
	1%	0%	0.3%	3%	3%	0.6%	0%	0%	0.6%	0%	8%	4%	2%
RA Prime Minister	5	3	4	3	1	2	0	6	13	0	2	2	41
	1%	2%	1%	0.5%	0.3%	1%	0%	43%	8%	0%	15%	0.5%	2%
Actor/host/singer/sportsperson	6	1	6	4	1	1	0	0	16	0	0	6	41
	1%	1%	2%	1%	0.3%	0.6%	0%	0%	9%	0%	0%	2%	2%
Journalist	3	0	2	19	1	0	0	0	3	3	1	7	39
	0.7%	0%	1%	3%	0.3%	0%	0%	0%	2%	16%	8%	2%	1%
“Prosperous Armenia” party	3	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	32
	0.7%	1%	0.3%	0.4%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	1%
“Bright Armenia” party	0	1	11	1	5	0	0	0	9	0	0	3	30
	0%	1%	3%	0.2%	2%	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Diaspora	8	2	5	1	2	1	0	0	3	0	0	2	24
	2%	1%	2%	0.2%	1%	0.6%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0.5%	1%
Church	4	2	1	3	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	18
	1%	1%	0.3%	0.5%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0.6%	0%	0%	0.5%	1%
Family member of a celebrity	1	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	13
	0.2%	0%	0.3%	0.5%	0.3%	0%	0%	0%	0.6%	0%	0%	2%	0.5%
“For the Republic” party	6	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.4%
	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7

“National Agenda” party	0%	0%	0%	0.5%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.3%	0.3%
“Homeland” party	0	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	7
	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0.6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.5%	0.3%
Armen Sargsyan/former RA President	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	0.2%	0%	0.3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.1%
Representatives of other countries	86	27	26	7	5	38	4	0	30	3	1	0	227
	19%	19%	8%	1%	2%	24%	27%	0%	18%	16%	7.70%	0%	9%
Representatives of international organizations	18	8	4	4	6	14	4	0	4	1	0	0	63
	4%	4%	1%	1%	2%	9%	27%	0%	2%	5%	0%	0%	2%
18 other political parties	14	4	3	13	13	0	0	1	3	0	0	8	59
	3%	3%	1%	2%	4%	0%	0%	7%	2%	0%	0%	2%	2%
Total	442	141	342	558	319	157	15	14	170	19	13	397	2587
	100%												

Table 7. Who Were the Posts on the Karabakh Conflict Taken from the Social Networks about (24.03 – 7.04, 2022)

Media outlet	About who in the social network posts on the Karabakh Conflict						
	On other countries	On Armenia	On Artsakh	On international organizations	On Diaspora	On international community	Total
Yerevan.Today	87	71	59	15	2	4	238
	37%	30%	25%	6%	1%	2%	100%
Hraparak.am	70	44	31	4	0	0	149
	47%	30%	21%	3%	0%	0%	100%
Aravot.am	85	4	5	12	0	0	106
	80%	4%	5%	11%	0%	0%	100%
Armtimes.com	44	19	30	4	0	3	100
	44%	19%	30%	4%	0%	3%	100%
Tert.am	38	8	1	7	0	0	54
	70%	15%	2%	13%	0%	0%	100%
Freeneews.am	22	7	19	6	0	0	54
	41%	13%	35%	11%	0%	0%	100%
1in.am	29	8	6	4	0	0	47
	62%	17%	13%	9%	0%	0%	100%
Lragir.am	18	5	2	4	0	0	29
	62%	17%	7%	14%	0%	0%	100%
Armlur.am	6	1	4	1	0	0	12

	50%	8%	33%	8%	0%	0%	100%
Civilnet.am	4	1	1	2	0	0	8
	50%	13%	13%	25%	0%	0%	100%
Ilur.am	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
AliqMedia.am	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total	403	168	158	59	2	7	797
	51%	21%	20%	7%	0%	1%	100%

Table 8. Who Were the Posts on the Russian-Ukrainian War Taken from the Social Networks about (24.03 –7.04, 2022)

Media outlet	About Who in the social network posts on the Russian-Ukrainian war					
	On other countries	On Armenia	On Artsakh	On international organizations	On Diaspora	Total
1in.am	25	1	0	0	0	26
	96%	4%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Tert.am	25	0	0	0	0	25
	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Armtimes.com	10	1	1	0	0	12
	83%	8%	8%	0%	0%	100%
Yerevan.Today	9	2	0	0	1	12
	75%	17%	0%	0%	8%	100%
Lragir.am	11	0	0	0	0	11
	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%

Aravot.am	5	2	0	2	0	9
	56%	22%	0%	22%	0%	100%
Freenews.am	2	1	0	0	0	3
	67%	33%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Hraparak.am	7	0	0	1	0	8
	88%	0%	0%	13%	0%	100%
Armlur.am	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Civilnet.am	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Ilur.am	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
AliqMedia.am	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total	94	7	1	3	1	106
	89%	7%	1%	3%	1%	100%

Table 9. Whose Social Network Posts Were Reproduced in the Media Outlets and on What Topics (5.01-20.02, 2022)

Who/on what topics	<u>Internal political issues</u>	<u>Foreign affairs</u>	<u>Internal societal issues</u>	<u>Karabakh conflict</u>	<u>Captives/preservation of heritage</u>	<u>Security/Army</u>	<u>Armenia-Turkey reconciliation</u>	<u>International organizations</u>	<u>Economy</u>	<u>Social issues</u>	<u>Legal/judiciary</u>	<u>Rights/ freedoms/media</u>	<u>Migration</u>	<u>Environmental protection</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Education/science</u>	<u>COVID/Healthcare</u>	<u>Church</u>	<u>Other topics</u>	<u>Information war</u>	<u>Life in post-war Artsakh</u>	<u>Diaspora</u>	<u>Events in other countries</u>	<u>Total %</u>
Expert	75	32	28	53	28	53	24	5	11	8	134	31	4	2	4	19	25	1	11	2	2	2	27	581 21%
“With Honor” faction	68	17	2	72	13	87	24	7	8	1	20	7	3	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	23	355 13%
Government	23	76	3	10	13	5	22	1	29	6	13	5	2	8	6	43	44	1	9	1	0	14	6	340 12%
“Hayastan” faction	46	15	5	30	3	40	16	6	5	6	60	17	0	1	2	1	7	0	3	0	1	0	1	265 10%
Artsakh representative	6	0	11	35	11	35	0	1	0	7	8	1	0	1	3	2	21	2	4	4	17	0	3	172 6%
RA Human Rights Defender	4	0	2	35	10	33	0	0	2	7	25	43	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	165 6%
“Civil Contract” party	34	7	3	9	2	9	2	2	5	6	4	3	4	0	4	1	12	0	6	0	0	1	0	114 4%
Non-political agency	2	2	3	0	2	2	1	0	11	8	19	0	0	8	18	4	13	0	15	0	2	0	0	110 4%
Territorial Administration	21	1	5	2	3	8	0	2	6	15	4	0	0	4	4	6	6	2	14	0	0	0	0	103

																									4%
Ordinary user	16	6	11	4	1	9	4	2	1	0	15	0	0	0	3	4	3	0	11	0	0	0	6	96 3%	
Individual political/public figure	13	1	2	8	1	3	4	1	7	5	8	5	1	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	68 2%	
“Prosperous Armenia” party	5	6	6	9	1	6	7	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	6	54 2%	
Journalist	14	1	3	5	0	2	2	1	0	1	6	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	44 1.6%	
Actor/host/singer/sports person	6	1	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	17	1	5	0	7	0	0	0	0	44 1.6%	
RA Prime Minister	7	2	1	3	0	1	5	18	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	43 1.6%	
“Bright Armenia” party	8	4	1	5	1	4	5	2	1	1	6	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	42 1.5%	
Diaspora	1	2	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	9	2	25 1%	
Church	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	10	0	0	0	4	0	20 0.7%	
Family member of a celebrity	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	0	0	13 0.5%	
“For the Republic” party	4	5	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12 0.4%	
“National Agenda” party	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10 0.4%	
“Homeland” party	6	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	10 0.4%	
18 other political parties	23	10	3	3	0	8	0	1	7	0	12	1	0	0	1	0	6	0	1	0	0	1	0	77 3%	
Total	384	188	96	287	89	314	116	56	94	74	344	122	14	24	65	83	151	21	93	10	23	33	82	2763 100%	

Table 10. Sources of the Social Network Posts Published in the Online Media Outlets (5.01-20.02, 2022)

Media outlet	Source of the reproduced/used social network post									Total
	Post without an indication of a definite social network	Facebook	Twitter	Telegram	YouTube	Instagram	TikTok	VK	Linkedin	
Yerevan.Today	4	536	5	5	2	1	1	0	0	554
	1%	97%	1%	1%	0,4%	0,2%	0,2%	0%	0%	100%
1in.am	60	282	71	14	2	5	0	3	1	438
	14%	64%	16%	3%	0,5%	1%	0%	1%	0,2%	100%
Hraparak.am	0	385	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	387
	0%	99%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Armtimes.com	1	307	16	8	0	5	0	0	0	337
	0.3%	91%	5%	2%	0%	1,5%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Aravot.am	0	307	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	317
	0%	97%	2%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Freeneews.am	1	133	22	5	0	5	0	0	0	166
	1%	80%	13%	3%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Lragir.am	58	48	27	4	1	0	1	0	0	139
	42%	34%	19%	3%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Tert.am	3	98	39	6	0	8	1	0	0	155

	2%	63%	25%	4%	0%	5%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Ilur.am	0	16	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	19
	0%	84.2%	15.8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
AliqMedia.am	0	8	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	15
	0%	53%	47%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Civilnet.am	0	12	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	13
	0%	92%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Armlur.am	8	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	13
	62%	15%	8%	0%	0%	0%	15%	0%	0%	100%
Total	135	2134	197	49	5	24	5	3	1	2553
	5%	83%	8%	2%	0.2%	1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.0004%	100%

Table 11. Sources of the Social Network Posts on the Karabakh Conflict Published in the Online Media Outlets (24.03-7.04, 2022)

Media outlet	Source of the reproduced/used social network post									
	Facebook		Twitter		Post without an indication of a definite social network		Telegram		Total	
Yerevan.Today	101	89%	4	4%	5	4%	4	4%	114	100%
Aravot.am	74	95%	2	3%	1	1%	1	1%	78	100%
Hraparak.am	64	96%	1	1%	2	3%	0	0%	67	100%
Armtimes.com	39	81%	6	13%	2	4%	1	2%	48	100%
1in.am	32	68%	11	23%	0	0%	4	9%	47	100%
Tert.am	27	69%	7	18%	3	8%	2	5%	39	100%
Lragir.am	13	48%	7	26%	4	15%	3	11%	27	100%
Freeneews.am	22	81%	3	11%	0	0%	2	7%	27	100%
Armlur.am	7	88%	0	0%	1	13%	0	0%	8	100%
Civilnet.am	2	50%	2	50%	0	0%	0	0%	4	100%

Ilur.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	100%
AliqMedia.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	100%
Total	381	83%	43	9%	18	4%	17	4%	459	100%

Table 12. Sources of the Social Network Posts on the Russian-Ukrainian War Published in the Online Media Outlets (24.03-7.03, 2022)

Media outlet	Source of the reproduced/used social network post									
	Telegram		Twitter		Facebook		YouTube		Total	
1in.am	8	31%	14	54%	4	15%	0	0%	26	100%
Tert.am	10	50%	4	20%	6	30%	0	0%	20	100%
Lragir.am	5	45%	6	55%	0	0%	0	0%	11	100%
Aravot.am	1	14%	0	0%	6	86%	0	0%	7	100%
Armtimes.com	2	33%	0	0%	3	50%	1	17%	6	100%
Yerevan.Today	2	50%	0	0%	2	50%	0	0%	4	100%
Hraparak.am	1	25%	1	25%	2	50%	0	0%	4	100%
Freenesws.am	0	0%	1	50%	1	50%	0	0%	2	100%
Ilur.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	100%
Armlur.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	100%
Civilnet.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	100%
AliqMedia.am	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	100%
Total	29	36%	26	33%	24	30%	1	1%	80	100%