Before, Russia Did Not Need to Interfere in Hungarian Politics Because Orbán and His Party Did the Job for Them

Hungarian expert and editor-in-chief of the fact-checking platform Lakmusz, SZILARD TECZAR, told us in this interview about the particular ways social media influences political developments and public perceptions in Hungary.

- Which social media platforms are most widely used by residents of Hungary? And what factors influence people’s choice of these platforms?

S.T. - Politically, Facebook is still the most important social media platform in Hungary and probably the most widely used. Although among younger generations, as I guess is the case everywhere in the world, Instagram and TikTok are gaining popularity. Politicians have also started using these platforms more heavily in recent years. But I would say that Facebook is still dominant.

On YouTube, we have some traditional media outlets, as well as completely new media outlets that operate only on YouTube and broadcast quite popular political shows. Maybe YouTube is not that important for politicians themselves, although they do use it for live streaming. They do not use it as much for other types of content, apart from a few exceptions.

And when it comes to X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram, which in other countries can sometimes be very relevant in this information context, they remain quite marginal in Hungary.

X is mostly used by political junkies. And since Elon Musk took over, it has, of course, shifted considerably toward the right wing.

Some fringe groups that are deeply involved in Russian disinformation or anti-vaccine disinformation have Telegram channels. But because the general public does not really use Telegram, these messages do not spread widely on the platform itself.

It happens, for example, that a disinformation story first appears on Telegram and is then copied word for word, or even shared as a screenshot, on Facebook. There, it can reach a much wider audience. So, that's the overall picture.

And I would say that when it comes to the choice between platforms, age is obviously a very important factor, because younger generations use TikTok and Instagram more widely. Political affiliation also plays a role to some extent, particularly when it comes to X and Telegram.

- Who is currently winning the competition for public attention: traditional media (television, online/print media) or social networks? Which communication channels do the government, opposition groups, and civil society representatives prefer to use when addressing the public, especially during critical periods such as elections, political and other crises, or when sharing urgent news?

S.T. - As you probably know, we had a change of government following the election in April this year. So, I think it is best if I divide my answer into two parts: before and after the April election.

Before the election, it was the government of Viktor Orbán. Although he did not really like to speak to or engage with the independent media, he had built a vast propaganda media empire around his party and government. So, evidently, he used this media empire quite heavily, although he, his government, and his party were also active on social media platforms.

At the time, it was a kind of dual communication strategy.

After the April election, Péter Magyar's government came to power. He does not have a comparable background in the media, apart from a few very small outlets close to the party. He does not control the traditional media, but he is very strong at communicating directly with voters through social media or even in person.

During the campaign, in-person communication was very important to him. He toured the country several times and even appeared in smaller towns and villages. So, in a way, I think that, to the extent possible, he is trying to bypass traditional media and focus on his followers on social media.

So, very often, he live-streams his appearances and political events. Especially, as you mentioned in the question, when it comes to breaking news or crises, he likes to communicate directly with voters. That is not to say that traditional media does not play a role. Of course, the government organizes press conferences, and sometimes Magyar and sometimes his ministers also give interviews. But clearly, when it comes to the top leadership, I think their strategy, or at least their priority, is direct communication with voters through social media.

And with Fidesz, Orbán's party, it is interesting because the former media empire has already started to disintegrate quite quickly, in my opinion. So, obviously, they have lost part of their reach. But I don't really see that they are intensifying their presence on social media either. Maybe they are still in a kind of transition period.

And, yes, I think civil society groups usually try to take every opportunity they have. So, they are quite happy to engage with traditional media. But, of course, they have their own communication strategies and channels, and also use social media.

- Which groups (government officials, political party leaders, civil society organizations) are the most active users of social media in your country? For whom has social media become a primary tool of communication?

S.T. - I think politicians themselves or political influencers are quite important. Although, when it comes to political influencers, I must also mention that the media empire formerly built by Orbán's Fidesz also included a government- or party-organized influencer network called Megafon. And it, too, has started to disintegrate. So, they have also lost some of their reach and reduced the intensity of their activity.

Maybe the most interesting aspect of the campaign on social media was that, even though Fidesz politicians posted much more frequently and shared much more content than Péter Magyar's party, TISZA consistently won the race in terms of engagement, including likes, comments, and shares.

I think this campaign demonstrated that quantity is not everything in a political campaign. I don't know, maybe TISZA's posts were of better quality or more engaging, or simply because they were, and still are, a relatively new party, people were more interested in them and engaged with their content much more than with Fidesz content.

- How does your country experience Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and other forms of public opinion manipulation in practice? What role do social networks play in these hybrid attacks and in efforts to counter them?

S.T. - Viktor Orbán and his party were quite close to Russia and Vladimir Putin. For many years, my main hypothesis was that Russia did not really need to invest too much in directly interfering in Hungary or in Hungarian politics, because Orbán's interests aligned quite well with those of Russia and Putin, and they had this very strong media empire behind them. So, they kind of voluntarily did the job for the Russians.

This changed a little bit during this year's election campaign because we heard reports of direct influence and disinformation campaigns coming from Russia, and there were some international observer groups that also documented some of these Russian campaigns. They were mainly active on X and Facebook, but even in this campaign, these disinformation actions directly attributable to Russia were less important than the domestic disinformation spread, for example, by Fidesz and its media.

These posts on X were very often in English, which I think in itself limited their impact on the Hungarian public. Also, the very fact that they were on X, which is not very widely used by Hungarians, limited their impact as well. And when these appeared on Facebook, even if the content was advertised on Facebook, according to our data collection, these reached a maximum of 100,000 people. This is, of course, not negligible in a country of less than 10 million people, but still not a very large part of the population.

So, I think the Russians tried to get directly involved this time, maybe because they felt that Orbán was losing and thought that they must try everything. But these campaigns, at least those that we can directly connect to Russia, were not very influential.

Apart from the fact that they sometimes tried to use the wrong channels or the wrong language, the content also showed that they were not very familiar with the Hungarian context. Their fake news stories were so obviously fake that even the pro-Orbán media did not pick them up.

For example, there was a story about Péter Magyar's ex-wife writing a memoir in which she accused Magyar of various things, such as domestic violence, as well as killing the family dog and other things like that. And this was so far-fetched that, of course, every Hungarian would know that if such a book really existed, the press would be full of stories about it.

So, it didn't have much of an impact. Sometimes these things could have more impact abroad. For example, I think Jarosław Kaczyński (Leader of a major opposition party in Poland - Ed.) believed this fake story about the fake memoir and mentioned it in an interview.

This video was produced with the financial support of the European Union and the German Marshall Fund of the United States Transatlantic Foundation (GMF TF). Its contents are the sole responsibility of the “Region” Research Center and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the GMF TF.