ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI CONTEXT DURING SNAP PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN

Arif Yunusov, Head of the Department of Conflict and Migration Studies of the Institute for Peace and Democracy (Azerbaijan)

On December 7, 2023, President Ilham Aliyev issued an order to hold snap presidential elections on February 7, 2024, without specifying the reasons behind this decision. This advancement of the elections by 15 months from the originally scheduled date in April 2025, which was unexpected for everyone, including government officials, prompted the natural question about its underlying motives. After all, the current president of Azerbaijan, dubbed “Triumphant” (in Azerbaijani “Muzaffar”) by government media following his 2020 victory, had no problems with power.

Unsurprisingly, leaders of major opposition parties viewed the information unfavorably, for, as the chairman of the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party Ali Karimli said, the abrupt announcement of the elections deprived the opposition of adequate preparation, potentially rendering the elections non-competitive once again. Furthermore, according to the politician, through the artificial escalation of tensions with the US, the EU and the OSCE due to a series of unlawful arrests preceding the elections, Ilham Aliyev “... laid the groundwork to facilitate election fraud.”

According to Arif Hajili, the leader of the opposition Musavat party, the scheduling of elections on short notice ignored the interests of Azerbaijani citizens. One week later, both major opposition parties decided to boycott the elections.

Azer Gasimli, director of the Institute of Political Management, linked the holding of presidential elections earlier than scheduled to a lack of confidence on the part of the head of state. “This year, Azerbaijan registered the lowest economic growth in the CIS. Social tension is growing in the country and will probably reach its peak next year. The authorities failed to translate the Karabakh victory into legitimacy and public support. The authorities have no trump cards to play in foreign policy,” he said. Gasimli further pointed out that “the snap elections were announced the day after the meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State O’Brien. Apparently, it became evident at the meeting that tensions between Azerbaijani authorities and the United States would intensify. Taking into account the repressions of recent months, it's reasonable to anticipate their continuation into the following year.”

Sociologist Bahruz Samedov concurred with this opinion, emphasizing that early presidential elections “attempt to ensure the legitimacy of the regime before the euphoria over the victory in Karabakh diminishes.”

Bashir Suleymanli, the head of the Institute for Citizens Rights, linked the snap elections in Azerbaijan to the upcoming presidential elections in the Russian Federation (March 2024). This connection, in his opinion, “is conditioned by the latest events in the South Caucasus and the confrontation of the global centers of power. Azerbaijani authorities may be seeking to hedge their bets.”

Representatives of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party were also caught off guard and, in the absence of a proper explanation for the reasons, initially offered different versions in December 2023, or avoided a straightforward answer.

The situation changed a month later, following Ilham Aliyev’s interview with government television channels, where he associated his decision on the elections with the onset of a new era for Azerbaijan, which commenced on September 20 (2023), after the fighting of September 19 in Nagorno-Karabakh, marking a “complete restoration of our sovereignty”. For his second reason, he pointed out that elections, conducted for the first time in the history of independent Azerbaijan across the entire territory of the country, including Karabakh, should be presidential in nature. The third reason was his 20th anniversary as president. “...And this also represents a distinct period, and we must acknowledge this as a sort of summary. The holding of presidential elections 20 years later will naturally serve as a comprehensive overview of this chronological period.”

The uninterrupted 20-year rule of I. Aliyev was summarized on voting day by a significant and widely expected lead over his “competitors” in the elections. He secured 92.12% of the vote, while the remaining 7.88% was shared among 6 other presidential candidates.

The “competitors” of the incumbent president in the elections

Independent experts in the country immediately observed that the other 6 presidential candidates approved by the Central Election Commission were staunch supporters of the incumbent President Ilham Aliyev.

Meanwhile, with the exception of Elshad Musayev, the chairman of the “Great Azerbaijan Party”, the remaining 5 candidates (Razi Nurullayev, a deputy and chairman of the “National Front Party”, Gudrat Hasanguliyev, a deputy and chairman of the “Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party”, Fazil Mustafa, a deputy and chairman of the “Great Order Party”, Zahid Oruj, a deputy, and Fuad Aliyev, the former head of the “Liberal Democratic Party”) were not participating in presidential elections against Ilham Aliyev for the first time. Each time they serve as a facade, creating the illusion of alternative options for voters. And this was so apparent that even pro-government experts and politicians did not take I. Aliyev’s “opponents” seriously. Thus, MP Rasim Musabekov, stating that there was no alternative to Ilham Aliyev, bluntly outlined the goals of the other “candidates”: “People running in the elections are solving their local problems,” that is, ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections they had “the opportunity to promote their party and accrue political capital.”

During the 6 debates held in January, the alternative candidates repeatedly commended I. Aliyev, who himself abstained from participating in the debates and meeting with voters; instead, his proxies from the ruling party took on this role. At a debate focusing on the restoration of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty (January 15, 2024), Razi Nurullayev identifying as a representative of the opposition, addressed the representative of the incumbent president, stating: “As a presidential candidate, I acknowledge the role of your candidate in the liberation of Karabakh and as a party leader I always stand by him.” He then fervently declared that if elected president, his very first action would be “... ensuring that the Constitution outlines the role of national leader Heydar Aliyev.” Another presidential candidate, Fuad Aliyev, remarked: “For years, the head of state Ilham Aliyev has delivered on his promises, and we constantly witnessed how he turned his promises into actions.”

During the debate on the new realities and Azerbaijan’s strategic goals (January 31, 2024), presidential candidate Zahid Oruj also lauded Ilham Aliyev’s foreign policy, highlighting that “... the information war is intensifying against our country,” and qualifying the dissemination of “... fake news regarding Ilham Aliyev’s offshore assets” as indicative of this phenomenon.

The campaign of effusive praising of Ilham Aliyev’s role by his rivals spurred independent journalists to conduct a program delving into the question “Why are presidential candidates praising Ilham Aliyev?”

Public reaction to the elections

Despite the circulated post-election images of widespread celebrations on the occasion of I. Aliyev’s reelection, numerous street surveys conducted by journalists during the campaign unveiled complete apathy among the population and a distinct lack of interest in the electoral process. Apart from the president, none of the candidates was recognizable to them; people were more interested in rising prices, unemployment, corruption, lawlessness of officials and police, and many other socio-economic issues. As for the relations with Armenians and Armenia, this topic was of minimal concern to everyday citizens.

Moreover, voter surveys conducted at meetings with presidential candidates revealed that the attendees were employees of state-funded organizations who were simply shuttled from one candidate's event to another. However, they openly expressed their intention to vote for Ilham Aliyev, stating “we have just been brought here.”

Armenian context during the pre-election period

Although Azerbaijani society was concerned with internal socio-economic problems, and a substantial part of the candidates’ election programs, including I. Aliyev’s, consisted of promises to address the population’s socio-economic challenges, the “Armenian question” held significant importance officially during the pre-election period.

In pro-government propaganda, these elections were dubbed “Victory Elections” (in Azerbaijani “Zafar sechkilyar”), as they were held across the entire territory of the republic.

Pro-government experts and politicians immediately began leveraging this topic. Towards the end of December 2023, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tofig Zulfugarov underscored two strategic objectives facing Azerbaijan:

• “to ensure extraterritorial communication between the two parts of the state - Eastern Zangezur and Nakhchivan;
• to secure access to the eastern shore of the largest freshwater reservoir in the South Caucasus - Lake Goycha,” i.e. Sevan.

“The gifts given by the Bolsheviks to Armenia must be thrown into the “dustbin of history,” he emphasized.

However, the focal points concerning the Armenian topic were determined in the above-mentioned interview with Ilham Aliyev. Here he reiterated his narrative on Armenia’s history, once again declaring that not only Yerevan, but also other settlements of Armenia were “historical Azerbaijani lands” that “were gradually transferred to Armenia.” And he posed the following question with fervor: did these “gifts from the Bolsheviks” stop Armenia? He answered himself: “No, Armenia grew even more impudent” and intensified its “territorial claims against Azerbaijan.” Consequently, during the Soviet era as well, Armenia consistently received further “new gifts”. This resulted in the reduction of the territory of Azerbaijan, from “almost 100 thousand square kilometers... to 86.6 thousand square kilometers.”

In the course of every possible leveraging of this topic in pro-government circles, there were even calls for reparations or compensation from Armenia for the damages inflicted on Azerbaijan. The suggested sum amounted to “hundreds of billions of dollars.” Some figures, like Farhad Mammadov, director of the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan, and Eldar Namazov, a former aide to Heydar Aliyev, went as far as to demand that the reparations issue be incorporated in the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Mazahir Panahov, the head of the Central Election Commission, also weighed in, stating that “Azerbaijani residents of Armenian descent have the opportunity to participate in the elections.” This statement, aside from being blatantly racist,, lacked clarity about its intended recipients. It remained ambiguous whether he was referring to the few Armenian residents of NK, who, according to the State Migration Service, remained after the exodus of the Armenian population and sought Azerbaijani citizenship, or those Armenian citizens of Azerbaijan who have been living in Azerbaijan throughout the conflict period.

The presidential candidates naturally addressed the Armenian issue along the main lines emphasized in I. Aliyev’s interview. Zahid Oruj stood out as particularly active. Even before the start of the debates, he proudly stated on his Facebook page that in 2023 “for the first time in the history of independent Azerbaijan” the “issue of the return of Western Azerbaijan” was raised in parliament, and that Heydar Aliyev had previously brought up this issue and dreamt of reclaiming “the lands of Western Azerbaijan - Goycha, Zangezur, Yerevan and other regions, whose return is integral to the nation’s roadmap and the ideal of struggle.” Noting that the return would be “peaceful,” he concluded his statement with the following words: “The Karabakh conflict began in Yerevan, and will end there. ...We will definitely return to Yerevan from Karabakh. The roads to Yerevan will be liberated from occupation, and our soldiers will gain access to the mountains around Goycha.”

The other presidential candidates were not far behind him in their approach. For instance, the election program of Elshad Musaev, who positioned himself as a liberal, outlined the main directions of his activities if elected head of state:

• “Forcing Armenia to peace, execution of delimitation and demarcation processes;
• Opening of the Zangezur corridor, maintaining focus on issues related to our historical lands, and the violated rights of our compatriots deported from Western Azerbaijan;
• Forcing Armenia to recognize the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan, as well as concluding a peace treaty.”

The presidential candidate debates followed a similar narrative. Thus, during his opening speech on January 15, 2024, Fazil Mustafa remarked: “If the defeated enemy refuses to acknowledge their defeat, then the war is going on. We've triumphed over a people with a sick mentality nurtured by the Armenians for the last 200 years. Now, having secured victory on the battlefield, we must prevail in diplomacy and achieve a peace treaty.” He further pointed out that “there can be no true peace without the Zangezur corridor, and we fully support the policy of the Azerbaijani leadership in this regard.”

Another candidate, Elshad Musayev, echoed Ilham Aliyev’s thesis that “Armenia was created on the territory historically belonging to Azerbaijan.” He went on to emphasize that all Armenian leaders were the same and that “there is no difference between Pashinyan, Kocharyan and Sargsyan.” According to him, the current leader of Armenia “continues the same dirty policy, he will not sign a peace treaty, he will sign it only when he sees the iron fist of Azerbaijan” and therefore “in negotiations with Armenia, the tough policy and the line that was adopted in 2020 during the 44-day war and last year on September 19-20 should continue.” He claimed that “it must be carried out in two directions: 1) forcing Armenia to peace and 2) returning our remaining lands from occupation. Previously, terms were dictated to us, now we are the ones to dictate terms.”

Fuad Aliyev promised during the debates to file “a lawsuit against Armenia for the destroyed nature in Karabakh. Azerbaijan has already spent $7 billion on the restoration of Karabakh and we will recover this money from Armenia.” On the other hand, Gudrat Hasanguliyev, emphasized that Azerbaijan “has not merely secured victory, but has triumphed over occupying fascist Armenia” and further promised to bring “war criminals to justice.”

On February 2, 2024, the independent Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS) released an interim report detailing observations from the first stage of the snap presidential elections - candidate nomination and registration, as well as the promotion campaign. According to the report, an analysis of 6 television debates organized on the Public TV channel showed that none (!) of the candidates criticized the current head of state who was also their formal competitor in the race for the 2024-2031presidency, especially in the context of the Karabakh issue and foreign policy (p.9). Here is an illustrative example: during a debate on foreign policy matters (January 22, 2024), Fazil Mustafa, when addressing the representative of Ilham Aliyev, without any hesitation openly stated: “I am a representative of the opposition and should, in theory, talk about the problems and shortcomings of the authorities’ foreign policy. However, I will refrain from doing that, as the foreign policy of the authorities is entirely aligned with the country’s interests.”

The remaining candidates echoed similar sentiments, advocating for measures such as “forcing Armenia to peace”, reclaiming the “historical lands of Azerbaijan”, opening the Zangezur corridor. They also condemned the West for supporting Armenia. In every possible way praising the actions of Ilham Aliyev for returning Karabakh to Azerbaijan, the presidential candidates promised to pay special attention to the return of Azerbaijanis to Karabakh and called for preventing any socio-economic challenges for them.

Later on, presidential candidates pledge to further honor those who fought in the war against the Armenians, by erecting huge monuments to those who died in the battles for Karabakh, to establish a “Park for the Heroes of the Liberation of Karabakh,” etc. There were also original suggestions. For instance, during the debate on the restoration of Karabakh (January 26, 2024), Fazil Mustafa pointed out that the city of Aghdam (the administrative center of Aghdam region), in the period from July 1993 to October 2020 was under the control of Armenian forces and over these 27 years turned into ruins, likening it to the “Hiroshima of the Caucasus” and stressing the ongoing reconstruction work there. He then proposed moving the country's capital from Baku to Aghdam.

But the most unique proposal, which drew everyone’s laughter in society and especially on social networks, was the solemn promise of candidate Razi Nurullayev, who pledged to produce a Hollywood movie titled “Conquerors of Shushi” featuring the world’s top stars as his first act after winning the election.

The topic of negotiations with Armenia received scant attention in the pre-election speeches of the presidential candidates; they merely echoed the theses expressed by Ilham Aliyev in his January interview, thus suggesting to negotiate with Armenia from a position of force to compel the signing of the necessary peace treaty on Azerbaijan’s terms.

The representative of Gudrat Hasanguliyev gave the most detailed explanation: “Regarding negotiations with Armenia and the signing of a just peace, we must do everything to prevent the resurgence of Armenia’s territorial claims on our lands. To achieve this, our priority is to bring to justice the war criminals, because of whom a number of our settlements were destroyed, wiped off the face of the earth, and thousands of people were killed. This must be done so that both the current and the future generations of Armenia renounce territorial claims to Azerbaijan and other neighbors.” He further pointed out that during the negotiations, Armenia should be clearly informed that “until the opening of the Zangezur corridor, no communications with Armenia should be established, and Armenia should not participate in any economic projects in the region.” However, even with these measures in place, “we should under no circumstances trust Armenians. We must recall the ethnic cleansing of our compatriots in Armenia, and until our refugees from Armenia are able to return to their homes in Armenia, we should accommodate them in Khankendi and other houses in Karabakh where Armenians lived.”

The possibility of the return of Armenians to their homes in Karabakh and other settlements of Azerbaijan was not raised by the candidates. The discussion centered around carrying out effective construction work and infrastructure development for the revival of Karabakh, focusing solely on the possibility of Azerbaijani refugeess return to their homes in Armenia and Karabakh. Zahid Oruj went the furthest in this matter, stating that it is quite possible to resettle up to 1 million people in Karabakh and create 400 thousand job opportunities there.

Judging by the speeches of the presidential candidates, it appeared that Armenia was to simply accept the terms of the peace treaty offered by Azerbaijan, essentially imposed on it from a position of strength. Not even once did the presidential candidates use the word “compromise”, nor did they say anything about certain proposals made by N. Pashinyan during the negotiation process. They did not address the fatigue experienced by Armenians and Azerbaijanis from the conflict either. They asserted that this peace was in Armenia’s own interest, as Armenia is currently facing a blockade, and peace with Azerbaijan would enable the opening of communications, leading to a significant change in the economic situation in Armenia. The peaceful initiatives of the Armenian leadership and, in particular, the “Crossroad of Peace” project proposed by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to unblock communications were completely overlooked.

Armenia and all its actions were viewed through a negative prism, portraying it as being influenced by the West and primarily France to sabotage the peace initiatives of Ilham Aliyev. As Zahid Oruj emphasized in his speech at the debate, “this Western policy also runs counter to the interests of Armenians and therefore we call on Armenia: do not become a toy in the hands of third forces, be friends with your neighbors, refrain from arms procurement, your security is determined by amicable relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.”

In this regard, the statements made by Ilham Aliyev that before signing a peace treaty, Armenia must first make amendments to its Constitution and other legal and regulatory documents, as well as the subsequent discussions initiated in Armenia on this matter sparked significant interest within society.

Director of the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan Farhad Mammadov noted that Ilham Aliyev’s demand was behind this, and therefore if “Yerevan really wants peace, then it should amend its Constitution, including previsions related to territorial claims to Azerbaijan.”

This topic garnered even greater attention during the pre-election period after Ilham Aliyev’s statement during a meeting in Baku (February 1, 2024) with the Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union Martin Chungong, in which he reiterated his demands on the Constitution and other legal and regulatory documents, adding that “...peace can be achieved by putting an end to these claims.”

External assessments of elections

Invitations were extended to the CIS Executive Committee and the OSCE/ODIHR Mission to observe the elections. The categorical rejection of a PACE mission led to a scandal: in January 2024, the Azerbaijani delegation was deprived of the right to vote for a year. PACE Resolution No. 15898 highlighted the ongoing violations of human rights, the growing number of political prisoners in Azerbaijan, and the refusal to grant PACE rapporteurs access to the Lachin Corridor in 2023. However, the leadership of Azerbaijan ignored PACE resolutions for years and continued violations in the field of human rights. And throughout these years, PACE treated Azerbaijan quite tolerantly - they slightly reprimanded the authorities of the republic and then offered reprieves. Members of the delegations of other countries to PACE in their interviews later openly noted that the main factor that led to the expulsion of the Azerbaijani delegation from PACE was Ilham Aliyev’s refusal to invite a PACE delegation to observe the elections.

As anticipated, the Central Election Commission of Azerbaijan reported no violations during the elections. Similarly, observers from the CIS countries found no violations, stating that “the elections were competitive, open and public, they were free, transparent and complied with the principles of democratic elections.” Russian representative I. Korotchenko went even further and said: “No EU country can boast of such a turnout for presidential elections as the one observed in Azerbaijan yesterday.”

However, this reaction was expected in advance. And even in the face of pressure by the authorities, independent local observers from the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS), in their initial report (February 8, 2024, p. 13) indicated numerous cases of ballot stuffing and other violations at 105 polling stations. They concluded that the elections held “did not meet the requirements of national legislation and international standards on free and fair elections, accompanied by the lack of a favorable democratic political environment and conditions for genuine political competition.” The opposition also pointed out numerous violations during the elections and called for annulment of the results.

Amidst the Azerbaijani authorities’ refusal to permit the PACE delegation to observe the elections, and the United States’ decision to refrain from making any comments on the elections in Azerbaijan, the position of the OSCE/ODIHR Mission stirred interest. The interim report of this organization (January 31, 2024) on the initial results of the snap presidential elections in Azerbaijan was critical, causing significant irritation to the Azerbaijani authorities. In response, on February 4, Azerbaijani authorities detained Nick Gugger, an OSCE/ODIHR observer from Switzerland, at Baku airport. They confiscated his diplomatic passport and, after detaining him for three hours, deported him from the country. Subsequently, a campaign was initiated in the government-controlled media and on TV that N. Gugger had been subjected to such humiliation because he had previously “criticized Azerbaijan for its aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh.”

This is the first case of deportation of an OSCE observer from Baku, which in addition caused a diplomatic scandal and tension between Switzerland and Azerbaijan - the Azerbaijani ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and apologized,. Added to that, he explained the reason for such a scandalous measure. It appears that N. Gugger, as a member of the Council of Europe, was placed on the “black list” of official Baku.

On February 8, 2024, the OSCE/ODIHR Mission published a report, in which they indicated that the snap presidential elections were held without real competition, in an environment of restrictions, government pressure on the media and obstacles to monitoring the elections by public organizations and with serious violations. It was also highlighted that seven candidates participated in the presidential elections, including the current head of state, but “six presidential candidates standing in this election other than the incumbent, all have been supportive of the President in the recent past” and “none of the contestants convincingly challenged the incumbent’s policies in their campaign messages, therefore not providing alternatives for voters.”

The report aimed to assess the elections as an electoral procedure, and did not delve into analyzing cases of hate speech directed towards Armenians; hence, this aspect was not addressed in the report.

Following this, the EU, along with the US and the United Kingdom, expressed full endorsement for the report released by the OSCE/ODIHR Mission, highlighting serious fraud and irregularities during the presidential elections in Azerbaijan. Of course, politicians from Turkey and many CIS countries came to the aid of Ilham Aliyev, attempting to portray the elections as actually conducted in a democratic environment. Russia took the most extreme stance, with its Foreign Ministry attempting to ridicule the OSCE/ODIHR report. However, it was apparent that the Azerbaijani authorities and Ilham Aliyev personally felt greatly offended by such a reaction from the collective West.

Armenian context following the elections

On February 14, 2024, Ilham Aliyev, having secured his fifth consecutive term, spoke at the inauguration ceremony in parliament and outlined Azerbaijan’s main priorities. In his speech, which lasted over an hour, he addressed various topics but notably omitted any mention of relations with Europe, as well as EU member states, PACE, and OSCE. He only once irritably remarked that “some 20-30 countries cannot speak on behalf of the international community, especially one country,” a clear reference to these organizations and France. He further pointed out that “all peoples in Azerbaijan live as a single, friendly family”, immediately after this directing a barrage of negative accusations against  Armenians, labeling them as “occupiers”, “deceivers”, “aggressors”, etc. At the same time, he “forgot” that in addition to several Karabakh Armenians who have accepted Azerbaijani citizenship, according to official data, from 30 to 40 thousand Armenians live in Baku and other regions of the country outside Karabakh.

Afterwards, Ilham Aliyev solemnly declared that “our family is the Turkic world.” This statement prompted a question among the Talysh, Lezgins, Kurds, Russians and other non-Turkic-speaking peoples of Azerbaijan—where do they stand in this family? Meanwhile, Ilham Aliyev underscored another key priority – strengthening ties with the Islamic world and consequently the imperative to combat Islamophobia. Additionally, he highlighted “close relationship with countries fighting neo-colonialism,” thereby once again alluding to Europe, especially France.

In conclusion, Ilham Aliyev addressed the entire spectrum of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, asserting that “we have resolved this issue”. He indicated that the remaining step was to sign a peace treaty, the text of which Azerbaijan had sent to Armenia leaving the decision to accept or reject it in Armenia's hands. According to Aliyev, if Armenia does not want peace and “will again put forward unfounded claims against us, then this treaty will not be signed, but nothing will change for Azerbaijan,” because “we have resolved our issue.” He concluded by stating, “My vote in Khankendi, the ballot that I cast in the ballot box, was not merely a ballot. This was the last nail in the coffin of Armenian separatists.”

Pro-government politicians, experts and the media immediately began to enthusiastically echo these statements by Ilham Aliyev, viewing them as the dawn of a “new wonderful future for Azerbaijan.” However, independent Azerbaijani politicians and experts remained skeptical about Azerbaijan's prospects in the context of an increasingly growing confrontation with the collective West. They believed that under Aliyev's leadership, human rights, democracy and economic freedoms would face even greater restrictions. And this skepticism was very soon reaffirmed: shortly after the inauguration, a new large-scale wave of arrests of dissidents swept through the country, culminating in the destruction and shutdown on March 7 of the only independent TV channel in Azerbaijan, Toplum TV, along with the arrest of many of its staff members.

However, the authorities did not limit themselves to repressions within the country. After the elections, they decided to discard any pretense of decency and turned their sights on their political opponents abroad: on March 5, presidential candidate Zahid Oruj, who after losing the elections to I. Aliyev, returned to his duties as chairman of the parliamentary Human Rights Committee, declared the need to intensify the fight against foreign groups (foreign journalists, the Armenian lobby and Azerbaijani political emigrants) waging “defamation campaigns” against I. Aliyev. And if it is not possible to arrest the “traitors” at official requests and bring them back to their homeland for punishment, Oruj suggested resorting to “all types of (their) neutralization as legitimate targets” of the state apparatus. In essence, through the words of this “deputy-human rights activist” I. Aliyev officially announced a policy of terror and assassination of Azerbaijani human rights activists and journalists living in exile in the West.

This is another piece in a series planned within the framework of the “Armenian-Azerbaijani Context in the Presidential Elections of Azerbaijan and Russia - 2024” Project of the “Region” Research Center.

Publication of this material is supported by Democracy Development Foundation. The opinions and positions expressed in the material may not reflect the views and positions of Democracy Development Foundation.