THE “FACADE AND BACKYARD” OF THE RPC'S COMPLETED MISSION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH - 2024

Laura Baghdasaryan, Director of ''Region'' Research Center

On April 17, 2024, reports surfaced about the withdrawal of the Russian Peacekeeping Contingent (RPC) from Nagorno-Karabakh. Given the radically transformed military and political situation and the realities on the ground at this point in time, such a decision was anticipated. Information also circulated intermittently suggesting the possibility of the peacekeepers still remaining in the region at least until the completion of their 5-year term (see: “Statement of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation,” November 10, 2020)  and undertaking other tasks. It was proposed that until November 2025 they could continue to protect the Armenian historical heritage in the region, participate in landmine clearance, and aid Azerbaijan in addressing humanitarian issues now related to Azerbaijani settlers in those territories. Nonetheless, following the exodus of the Armenian population from NK, the peacekeepers, alongside Azerbaijani units, were engaged in the restoration of gas and energy supplies to the region.  After all, over the preceding nearly nine months of blockade, the NKR had also been deprived of gas and electricity. While rarely, discussions emerged regarding the possible return of the Armenian population to their homes, albeit now on Azerbaijan’s terms (provided they accept Azerbaijani citizenship).

In any case, it is evident that the mission of Russian forces in the conflict zone concluded nearly 1.5 years ahead of the scheduled 5-year period (November 2020 - November 2025). Moreover, Russian peacekeepers spent the last 7 months of their service in NK without Armenians, solely in the company of the Azerbaijani side, gradually shutting down their monitoring posts in the former conflict zone.

In Azerbaijan and Russia, the withdrawal of the RPC from the conflict zone was evaluated with varying degrees of emotion and not entirely similar justifications. As for the Armenian side, the peak of discontent with the RPC’s inert role was associated with the dramatic hardships experienced by the Karabakh population throughout 2023 (blockade by Azerbaijan from December 2022 until military aggression against the NKR on September 19-20, 2023, total exodus of Karabakh Armenians to the RA during the final week of the same month).

The Reverse Side of Azerbaijani Assessments of the RPC

According to the initially established provision regarding the duration of the RPC’s presence in the conflict zone, there existed the option of automatically prolonging the peacekeepers’ mission for an additional 5 years “in the event 6 months prior to the expiry of the time period none of the Parties declares of its intention to terminate the application of the provision.”

It is evident that this mention automatically indicated Azerbaijan, where the arrival of Russian peacekeepers to “their territories” stirred irritation as it implied a long-term stay of Russian troops. It is also apparent that as a result in each and every Azerbaijani official statement, the RPC was cited as a contingent “temporarily located on Azerbaijan's territory.” 

Yet, for the Armenian population of NKR, the presence of military peacekeeping forces in the Karabakh conflict zone offered an opportunity to “return home” from Armenia, where they had fled during the 44-day war of 2020. In other words, especially during that period, the RPC was perceived in Armenia and NKR as a guarantor of the security of Karabakh Armenians on the ground, despite the absence of a publicly disclosed mandate, with clearly and specifically formulated provisions for the actions of the RPC in various scenarios of the evolving situation. The only document regulating the actions of the RPC was the Tripartite Ceasefire Statement of 2020, which outlined the areas of responsibility of the peacekeeping contingent (including the Lachin Corridor), the duration of redeployment of peacekeepers in the Lachin Corridor and, as mentioned earlier, the initial period of stay in the conflict zone.

On the Azerbaijani side, the premature withdrawal of the peacekeepers was presented as a sign of “a high level of mutual understanding between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Russia” (see “Deputy: The United States and France are the primary opponents to the resolution of the conflict in the South Caucasus”). According to Azerbaijani parliament member N. Aslan, the agreement on the early withdrawal of the RPC from Azerbaijan indicates that Russia “... does not harbor any imperial aspirations towards Azerbaijan,” as “... the RPC could have easily remained on Azerbaijan’s territory for more than a year - until the completion of the term agreed upon by the Tripartite Statement of November 2020. There would have been some ways to use Russian peacekeepers...” (see “The early departure of the RPC and the start of delimitation is a low blow to those seeking to moderate the South Caucasus”).  There are also, to say the least, strange interpretations of the premature withdrawal of the RPC from the NK zone, which directly link this action by Azerbaijan and Russia with the intention of depriving Armenia of the opportunity to strengthen the presence of European civilian observers on its territory. “...There are Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh, and their presence needs to be counterbalanced” (by reinforcing European observers in Armenia - L.B.). This, in turn, served as an occasion for the West to increase its presence in Armenia. It involves the so-called European observers on the border with Azerbaijan, perceived by Moscow and Baku as a covert EU military-police mission, and other methods of infiltration into the region via Armenia under the guise of “humanitarian missions.”

Azerbaijani expert R. Huseynov, the author of these statements, appears to overlook the fact that:

• firstly, a military peacekeeping contingent cannot, in principle, be counterbalanced by an (unarmed) civilian observation mission, no matter how significantly increased;

• secondly, there are Russian military units in Armenia (102nd military base in Gyumri), along with Russian border guards present since 1992, long before the deployment of the RPC in NK (2020) and the initiation of the European civilian observation mission in Armenia (2022);

• thirdly, the only official text on the RPC is known as the Trilateral Statement, since in addition to Russia and Azerbaijan, it was also signed by Armenia, etc.

Amidst the presented rosy information picture of the Azerbaijani-Russian mutual understanding regarding the RPC, the reality on the other side of the façade, however, was not so seamless. While there were only several statements from both the Russian and Azerbaijani sides directly criticizing each other throughout the entire stay of the RPC in Nagorno-Karabakh, these occasional remarks hinted at underlying serious disagreements. Discussions between Russia and Azerbaijan on the periodic ceasefire violations by Azerbaijan in the conflict zone, the peacekeeper mandate that was never signed by Azerbaijan and other derivative issues did not lead to public confrontations between the parties. However, for example, the July 2023 statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry highlighted the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh unfolding negatively due to the deepening humanitarian crisis in the region, calling upon the Azerbaijani leadership to “take urgent measures to immediately unblock the Lachin Corridor and resume unhindered movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions, as well as energy supply to the region” (see “Statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh”). In response, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry expressed “perplexity and disappointment” by the fact that:

• the Russian Foreign Ministry “interpreted and linked the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the acknowledgment by the Prime Minister of Armenia, which has been occupying our territories for almost 30 years, that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan”;

• the RPC refrained from taking any steps to prevent the Armenian side from “using” the Lachin road for “transportation of military cargo and mines from Armenia to Azerbaijan, rotation of illegal military formations, and the illegal importation of third-country citizens into the territory”;

• “Contrary to the tripartite statement of 2020, in which the Russian Federation is a signatory, the complete withdrawal of the remaining Armenian armed forces operating within Azerbaijani territory has not yet been secured. On the contrary, support for the Armenian armed forces is being provided in the region under the oversight of the Russian peacekeeping contingent” (see “Commentary to the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on July 15, 2023”).

Rare pointed references to Azerbaijan as a ceasefire violator in the Karabakh conflict zone in the daily press releases of the RPC (see, for instance, the bulletin dated August 1, 2022) , the use of the term “Nagorno-Karabakh” instead of “Karabakh economic region”, and the designation to the opposing side as “armed formations of NK”  also sparked public irritation within official circles of Azerbaijan.

“I believe that the RPC’s vocabulary hints at irritation due to powerlessness. It is apparent that Baku’s independent stance and actions concerning Ukraine, increased gas supplies to Europe, and the provision of alternative transit for Kazakh oil, etc. provoke a negative reaction from Moscow. However, in the current situation, Russian leadership and military command can only exert verbal or linguistic pressure on Azerbaijan. Our nerves are strong. We'll survive. Yet, we will not forget anything,” member of Azerbaijani parliament R. Musabekov told Russian “Kommersant” with regards to the military clashes in the Lachin Corridor between Azerbaijani forces and military units of the NKR Defense Army on August 1, 2022 (see “Fire roamed through the corridor”).

During Azerbaijan’s large-scale military operation against the NKR on September 19-20, 2023, it was reported that 6 Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh lost their lives. They were shot by the Azerbaijani military, as later stated by the Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan, who “had confused” their vehicle with that of “illegal Armenian armed formations.” The “incident” was considered settled following a phone call between I. Aliyev and V. Putin, expressed regret over what happened and a promise of material compensation to the victims’ families.

Russian High Praise and Armenian Discontent with the RPC

Three months prior to the decision to withdraw the RPC from the NK conflict zone (in January 2024), Russian official circles through the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed Moscow and Baku’s high regard for the RPC’s activities, along with the potential return of the Armenian population of NK: “We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of creating conditions for the Armenian population to return to Karabakh, based on statements by Baku. We have highlighted the need to properly ensure the rights and, most importantly, the security of the Armenian population of Karabakh. We are ready to offer every possible assistance to this process, including through the RPC.”
However, following the dissemination of information about the decision of the heads of Russia and Azerbaijan to withdraw the RPC from its deployment area, there were voices suggesting that the peacekeepers’ mission was fully accomplished, indicating that “it’s time for our military to return home.”

Judging by numerous similar assessments, the complete fulfillment of the RPC’s mission implied humanitarian aid provided to the (Armenian) population during the days of the “September bloodshed of 2023”, and “assistance to the people with evacuation, medical treatment, and provision of water and food supplies...”

Russian President Spokesman D. Peskov attributed this premature decision to the fact that “there are no more functions left for them (peacekeepers),” highlighting new realities following Armenia’s recognition of the borders of Azerbaijan as of 1991.”  The explanation provided by the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs K. Zatulin particularly serves as an eye-opener: “... One could defend the idea that they (Russian peacekeepers) are there to safeguard Armenian property and cultural landmarks... However, this entirely depended on the goodwill of Azerbaijan itself... It seems they are going to assimilate this territory and gradually erase traces of the presence of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. In this context, Russian peacekeepers would become a source of conflict,” since if the peacekeepers protested against such actions, it would complicate relations with Azerbaijan. Conversely, if they refrained from protesting, as observed during Azerbaijan’s September offensive, Yerevan would start accusing the peacekeepers of being “complicit with Azerbaijan.”

Indeed, various circles in Russia frequently raised public concerns regarding the effectiveness of the RPC in Nagorno-Karabakh due to official statements from Yerevan expressing discontent with their activities. However, the Russian side responded to all these statements, deeming them unfounded. For instance, in an April 2024 interview with Russian radio stations , Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov contested the assertion that “the exodus of Armenians from Karabakh was due to our peacekeepers' inaction...”, because “when with the involvement of the European Union they signed the document, declaring that Karabakh is now Azerbaijan, the Alma-Ata Declaration is in force, there was no mention regarding the necessity to ensure the special rights of the Armenian national minority in Azerbaijan․” It appears as if the Armenian population fled in September 2023 not due to Azerbaijan’s military attack on the NKR, but due to the lack of a provision on the special rights of Karabakh Armenians within Azerbaijan in the document brokered by Brussels and Washington.

S. Lavrov also deemed as unfounded the persistent criticisms from various Armenian official circles throughout the NKR blockade. In particular, they claimed that the RPC failed to fulfil its duty to ensure unimpeded movement through the Lachin Corridor, which was their area of responsibility. It was as though there is no specific provision for this in the 2020 Tripartite Statement.

However, the epitome of excessive efforts (to put it plainly - manipulation) to showcase the “bias” of the Armenian side towards the RPC reached its pinnacle with a January 2024 speech by the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry M. Zakharova. In an attempt to once again refute critical assessments of the inaction of the RPC on the Armenian side, which led to ethnic cleansing, M. Zakharova did not reference the Tripartite Statement on measures to maintain the ceasefire, but the Resolution of the Federation Council of November 18, 2020 concerning the deployment of a Russian military unit to Nagorno-Karabakh. The document underscores that the RPC's deployment in the conflict zone is intended to “comply with the ceasefire agreements, to prevent mass casualties among the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as significant damage to civilian infrastructure.”  Ignoring Azerbaijan's failure to comply with the ceasefire agreements, M. Zakharova asserted that since there were no mass casualties among the civilian (Armenian) population nor mass destruction of civilian infrastructure (in Nagorno-Karabakh), the RPC fulfilled its mission entirely. “Did any of these goals remain unfulfilled? If anyone has the conscience, or the audacity in its absence, to claim otherwise, present evidence, lay out your arguments. After all, there are none, just hysteria and insults,”  publicly lamented the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, abandoning diplomatic language.

Based on numerous other statements by Russian speakers with identical arguments, Azerbaijan’s offensive on the NKR in 2023 appeared to have enhanced the reputation of the RPC among Armenians.

Armenian reproaches against the RPC stemmed from the belief that the fundamental purpose of the presence of Russian peacekeepers was to prevent violations of the provisions outlined in the 2020 statement, be it initiating armed escalations and improving positions in the conflict zone in front of the RPC, or blocking the only access to the outside world again in the presence of the RPC, etc. (see, for example, “... Effectively, it appears that the commitment outlined in the tripartite Statement to supervise the Lachin Corridor is not being upheld by the Russian peacekeeping forces either, due to Azerbaijan’s unlawful actions. Nonetheless, the situation remains unchanged, as the primary objective of the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces is to prevent such lawlessness and maintain control over the Lachin Corridor”).

The material was prepared within the framework of the “Armenian-Azerbaijani Context in the Presidential Elections of Azerbaijan and Russia - 2024” Project of the “Region” Research Center.

Publication of this material is supported by Democracy Development Foundation. The opinions and positions expressed in the material may not reflect the views and positions of Democracy Development Foundation.