Politicians Shape the Information Space in Ways That Serve Their Interests

In this interview, Valeriu Pașa, head of WatchDog.MD, discusses how information bubbles are formed in Moldova, including through the use of political technologies.

- Which social media platforms are most widely used by residents of Moldova? And what factors influence people’s choice of these platforms?

V.P. - This is a very interesting question because there are two different aspects to it. The first is how many residents are registered on each social network. The second aspect, in the attention economy - or the competitive environment for people’s attention- is how much time they spend on each of these social networks.

In terms of the number of users, Facebook currently remains the leader, with around 65% of the adult population using Facebook. It is followed by Instagram and YouTube, with approximately 40% using each of these social networks, as well as TikTok, with more than 35%. Around 25% of respondents in various surveys say they use Telegram.

But if we are talking about the volume of content consumption, TikTok comes out on top. Even though it has fewer users, the platform’s algorithm is designed to keep people hooked. In recent years, Facebook, and to some extent Instagram and YouTube, have essentially copied TikTok’s core functionality: short-form videos, endless scrolling, and drawing users into specific “thematic loops” or addictive loops. Ultimately, the business model is built around capturing and retaining people’s attention - in other words, maximizing traffic.

So, in terms of influence on public opinion, I think TikTok has taken the lead over the past two years. As sources of information, where people get their news, Facebook and YouTube are still at the top.

And this is very important. There is a specific element that applies to Moldova, Western European countries, and Armenia. These are people who believe that there is news on TikTok. In public opinion surveys, you can ask: “Which social networks do you get your news from?” And everywhere, there is a segment of the population that says they have read or watched the news on TikTok. This is a cross-border phenomenon. This group is the most susceptible to disinformation. People who believe there is news on this garbage platform are the most vulnerable. It is a frightening thing. In terms of its destructive influence on public opinion, TikTok is a weapon of mass destruction.

TikTok’s algorithm is designed to promote content that fuels anxiety. It is built to promote fake news, various conspiracy theories, and other harmful content that affects people’s psychological well-being.

This does not mean that other social networks are flawless, but the very essence of TikTok lies in distorting public opinion and behavior.

- Who is currently winning the competition for public attention: traditional media (television, online/print media) or social networks? Which communication channels do the government, opposition groups, and civil society representatives prefer to use when addressing the public, especially during critical periods such as elections, political and other crises, or when sharing urgent news?

V.P.- When it comes to government institutions, the standard approach is to publish posts across all available social media platforms, ditribute press releases, or hold a press conference to present the information. When it comes to civil society - for example, our organization - one distribution channel will never be enough. 

It is clear that social media has a much greater influence. But, on the other hand, traditional media, in the conventional sense, also influence trends on social media. So, there is a certain balance between the two.

When it comes to Moldova’s opposition, social media and online information platforms are, of course, particularly important to them. They find it very convenient to deliver a monologue there. For example, if you appear on a TV program, you may be seated face-to-face with an opponent, in which case you have to present counterarguments and engage in discussion and debate, rather than simply broadcasting propaganda.

Opposition politicians in Moldova have been avoiding this for many years. When they do appear on traditional media outlets, it is usually on the condition that they will be the only ones on air.

And this is very bad because it undermines the democratic process of debate, in which the public has an opportunity to hear the arguments of different sides. Debates usually take place only during election periods, and they turn into a circus. They are mainly followed by highly politically active citizens who have already made up their minds about who is good and who is bad. But for the broader public, which is less interested in politics, such debates do not provide an opportunity to make an informed decision. I have seen debates in Armenia, and I have seen the reaction of Armenian users and the comments on social media, it's the same thing there. It is impossible to watch.

The lack of platforms where debates can take place, especially outside election periods, is very problematic. And politicians exploit this. For example, our capital’s mayor has been holding the city government’s operational meetings exclusively online for many years. Why? Because journalists are not present: a series of statements is made, press releases are read out, and politicians simply talk about themselves. If these meetings were held in person at City Hall, journalists would come and start asking questions - and the mayor never answers them.

In this way, politicians shape the information space to serve their own interests. In other words, what we call accountability is lacking, and there is no consideration of the public interest.

- Does this mean that Moldovan media do not organize discussion programs between elections?

V.P.- No, they do exist, and there are quite a lot of them. But most political leaders refuse to participate in such formats. At best, they delegate lower-ranking politicians to take part. But more often than not, representatives of the pro-Russian opposition simply refuse to participate in debates on independent media outlets.

And this is very interesting. They say, “You all work for the government; you protect and promote it.” Yet at the same time, they themselves refuse to answer questions or appear on air, or they agree to come only when they can speak alone.

What does this lead to? The segment of society that supports these politicians simply does not watch such media outlets. But if a politician they trust appeared on one of these programs, they would watch it and, consequently, hear the arguments of the other side. This would create a certain dialogue.

The phenomenon is to ensure that citizens who support a particular party also hear from other politicians, so that they can form their own opinions. If people are kept in such an information bubble, they will not even be able to objectively understand what the counterarguments are or what it is about.

Ultimately, this leads to a lack of dialogue between different segments of the electorate, with people becoming unable even to hear each other’s arguments. In other words, this is a political strategy that leads to even greater polarization in society.

- Which groups (government officials, political party leaders, civil society organizations) are the most active users of social media in Moldova? For whom has social media become a primary tool of communication?

V.P.- Again, this applies to civil society in the broad sense, as well as to those whom we call influencers. Clearly, these are the most active people on social media.

There is a certain type of politician who has built their entire public image specifically through social media, and they are also very active users. In general, everyone is present there — both government representatives and the opposition.

It is difficult to find an important public or political figure who does not have a primary social media platform for communicating with society and promoting their ideas. All the ministers, all the ministries, members of parliament, party leaders, and so on are present there.

- How does your country experience Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and other forms of public opinion manipulation in practice? What role do social networks play in these hybrid attacks and in efforts to counter them?

V.P.- Social media is both the main platform for spreading manipulation and FIMI and the environment where we can most effectively counter it.

It is paradoxical. I observed how interference in Armenia’s elections took place and how various narratives were promoted. Social media played a major role in this, but at the same time, it was also the main platform for countering these efforts and mobilizing society against this phenomenon.

Approximately the same thing is happening in Moldova, with one side or the other gaining the upper hand at different times. In the two or three months leading up to Moldova’s parliamentary elections, social media was the key platform that enabled society to mobilize against this interference. If you weigh the pros and cons, so to speak, the overall result is probably positive. After the elections, however, the trend clearly shifted into negative territory. It is an endless struggle.

- Does the pro-Russian opposition in Moldova have its own media outlets through which, in addition to social media, it seeks to influence public opinion?

V.P.- In Moldova, there are few media outlets affiliated with specific political parties; there used to be many more. There are several media outlets that clearly work in support of the Socialist Party, but they are small outlets with limited reach.

Overall, there is a vast ecosystem operated from Russia. It includes news websites, Telegram channels, influencers, YouTube projects, television outlets, and specific journalists working for particular TV channels. All of them operate in the interests of the pro-Russian opposition.

At a certain point, most of them were linked to the  ȘOR Party (or group), which was never a political party in the true sense of the word. It was more of a platform and a tool through which Russia carries out interference. Once they had completely abandoned conventional political competition, they turned into an influence infrastructure supporting a wide range of political forces.

Support is provided even to parties that officially present themselves as pro-European but, in reality, promote rhetoric that clearly serves the interests of the Russian Federation.

This video was produced with the financial support of the European Union and the German Marshall Fund of the United States Transatlantic Foundation (GMF TF). Its contents are the sole responsibility of the “Region” Research Center and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the GMF TF.